Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2007 im Fachbereich Politik - Region: Südasien, Note: 1,3, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Seminar für wissenschaftliche Politik), Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Das „123 Agreement” von 2007 zwischen Indien und den USA zur Kooperation auf dem Gebiet der Nukleartechnologie ist ein Meilenstein in den US-indischen Beziehungen mit weitreichenden Folgen nicht nur für diese beiden Staaten, sondern für die weltweite Nonproliferationspolitik und für die gesamte Staatengemeinschaft. Dieses ist – stark verkürzt – das Ergebnis der Untersuchung des auch als „N-Deal”, als „Nuclear-Deal” bezeichneten Abkommens zwischen Indien und den USA. Auf dem Weg zu diesem Ergebnis erläutert der Autor Intention und Inhalt der maßgeblichen Vertragswerke – insbesondere: des „123 Agreement” („Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy”) und des „Hyde Act” („An act to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India. Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.”) Der „Hyde Act” ist ein US-Sondererlaubnisgesetz für den Atomdeal mit Indien, denn eigentlich käme Indien aufgrund seines militärischen Atomprogramms für ein solches Abkommen gar nicht in Frage. Die Kritiker in den USA fürchten eine Konterkarierung der amerikanischen Nonproliferationspolitik. Der Autor beleuchtet, warum die USA dennoch den „N-Deal” initiierten und warum das Sondererlaubnisgesetz „Hyde Act” aus indischer Sicht die nationale Souveränität infrage stellt und deshalb unannehmbar ist. Das „123 Agreement” hingegen ermöglicht dank vieler Leerstellen und vager Formulierungen beiden Seiten eine Zustimmung. Angesichts der Differenzen zwischen „Hyde Act” und „123 Agreement” ist eine offene Frage, ob sich im Falle von Konflikten zukünftige US-Regierungen an die sich überlagernden Bestimmungen des nationalen Rechts („Hyde Act”) oder des internationalen Rechts („123 Agreement”) halten werden. In jedem Fall aber stellt das „123 Agreement” ein weitreichendes Entgegenkommen der USA gegenüber Indien und einen dramatischen Höhepunkt in den US-indischen Beziehungen dar. Um dieses zu verdeutlichen und um die Interessenslagen Indiens und der USA zu skizzieren, gibt der Autor einen Überblick über die bisherigen US-indischen Beziehungen mit besonderem Fokus auf deren Nuklearpolitik.

Originally published in 1983, this book presents both the technical and political information necessary to evaluate the emerging threat to world security posed by recent advances in uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment has played a relatively quiet but important role in the history of efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and by a number of others to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the uranium enrichment industry was dominated by a single method, gaseous diffusion, which was technically complex, extremely capital-intensive, and highly inefficient in its use of energy. As long as this remained true, only the richest and most technically advanced nations could afford to pursue the enrichment route to weapon acquisition. But during the 1970s this situation changed dramatically. Several new and far more accessible enrichment techniques were developed, stimulated largely by the anticipation of a rapidly growing demand for enrichment services by the world-wide nuclear power industry. This proliferation of new techniques, coupled with the subsequent contraction of the commercial market for enriched uranium, has created a situation in which uranium enrichment technology might well become the most important contributor to further nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the issues addressed in this book are: A technical analysis of the most important enrichment techniques in a form that is relevant to analysis of proliferation risks; A detailed projection of the world demand for uranium enrichment services; A summary and critique of present institutional non-proliferation arrangements in the world enrichment industry, and An identification of the states most likely to pursue the enrichment route to acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions﷿ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning ﷿possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.﷿ A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAE's ﷿final assessment on the resolution﷿ of the outstanding issues. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.

This book provides an international legal analysis of the most important questions regarding Iran's nuclear program since 2002. Setting these legal questions in their historical and diplomatic context, this book aims to clarify how the relevant sources of international law - including primarily the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA treaty law - should be properly applied in the context of the Iran case. It provides an instructional case study of the application of these sources of international law, the lessons which can be applied to inform both the on-going legal and diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Iran nuclear dispute itself, as well as similar future cases. Some questions raised regard the watershed diplomatic accord reached between Iran and Western states in July, 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action. The answers will be of interests to diplomats and academics, as well as to anyone who is interested in understanding international law's application to this sensitive dispute in international relations.

This publication explores the concept of common security and the legal foundations for its application in outer space law, based on the premise that outer space is an internationalised common area beyond the national jurisdiction of individual states, and therefore security in space must be the common security of all states. Chapters cover a range of issues including: the principle of the peaceful use of outer space, passive military uses, and multilateral negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space; structural change of international law and the common heritage of mankind principle; and proposals for a multilateral agreement and the creation of an International Organisation for Common Security in Outer Space.