This SpringerBrief deals with a class of discrete-time zero-sum Markov games with Borel state and action spaces, and possibly unbounded payoffs, under discounted and average criteria, whose state process evolves according to a stochastic difference equation. The corresponding disturbance process is an observable sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with unknown distribution for both players. Unlike the standard case, the game is played over an infinite horizon evolving as follows. At each stage, once the players have observed the state of the game, and before choosing the actions, players 1 and 2 implement a statistical estimation process to obtain estimates of the unknown distribution. Then, independently, the players adapt their decisions to such estimators to select their actions and construct their strategies. This book presents a systematic analysis on recent developments in this kind of games. Specifically, the theoretical foundations on the procedures combining statistical estimation and control techniques for the construction of strategies of the players are introduced, with illustrative examples. In this sense, the book is an essential reference for theoretical and applied researchers in the fields of stochastic control and game theory, and their applications.

This book presents state-of-the-art solution methods and applications of stochastic optimal control. It is a collection of extended papers discussed at the traditional Liverpool workshop on controlled stochastic processes with participants from both the east and the west. New problems are formulated, and progresses of ongoing research are reported. Topics covered in this book include theoretical results and numerical methods for Markov and semi-Markov decision processes, optimal stopping of Markov processes, stochastic games, problems with partial information, optimal filtering, robust control, Q-learning, and self-organizing algorithms. Real-life case studies and applications, e.g., queueing systems, forest management, control of water resources, marketing science, and healthcare, are presented. Scientific researchers and postgraduate students interested in stochastic optimal control,- as well as practitioners will find this book appealing and a valuable reference. ​

This volume contains papers which were presented at the XV Latin American Congress of Probability and Mathematical Statistics (CLAPEM) in December 2019 in Mérida-Yucatán, México. They represent well the wide set of topics on probability and statistics that was covered at this congress, and their high quality and variety illustrates the rich academic program of the conference.

Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."

Introducing a new approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and distributed artificial intelligence, this guide shows how classical game theory can be used to compose basic learning units. This approach to creating agents has the advantage of leading to powerful, yet intuitively simple, algorithms that can be analyzed. The setup is demonstrated here in a number of different settings, with a detailed analysis of agent learning behaviors provided for each. A review of required background materials from game theory and reinforcement learning is also provided, along with an overview of related multiagent learning methods.