Within the context of civil war the economic structure of Yugoslavia is being tenuously held together. Having the legacy of neither a free-market nor strictly socialist economy, the experience of Yugoslavia is unique amongst East European countries. This book draws out the important experience of a self-managed market-socialist type economy and asks the question of whether or not this point of departure will secure an advantageous position for the country. The contributors to this volume analyse the theory of self-management and how it operated in practice. They conclude that this approach did not bring the anticipated benefits, and that inequality not only persisted but actually increased under self-management. The economic situation has therefore been a driving force for political reform. In the concluding section, the editors draw out the lessons that emerge from the Yugoslavian experience for other East European political economies now in the complex process of transformation to market-style economies.

This book brings together for the first time a comprehensive documentary record of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, tracing the responses both of the United Nations and regional organisations. Many of the documents reproduced are otherwise inaccessible. This volume contains all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements together with the records of the debates leading to their adoption; reports on the crisis compiled by the UN Secretary-General; and extracts from decisions and debates in the UN General Assembly. The efforts of regional organisations are reflected in general documents from, amongst others, the EC, NATO, the Western European Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Yugoslavia's system of "socialist self-management," once touted by many as the most efficient of east European systems, has since 1979 been plagued by inflation, falling wages, and economic deline. Here, Lydall presents an original study of the operation of the Yugoslav system. He surveys the social and political tensions resulting from this decline and the possible future of the ruling party as it attempts to improve the economy and maintain power. This book holds important implications for the future of socialism in both East and West.

What can outside powers do now to help heal the terrible wounds caused by Yugoslavia's wars? Why did the victors in the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War not act to stop the slaughter? The nature, scope, and meaning of the actions and inactions of outsiders is the subject of this book.

"This book examines the emergence, implementation, crisis and the breakdown of the fourth (Kardelj's) constitutive concept of Yugoslavia (1974-1990), and relations between anti-statist ideology of self-management and the actual collapse of state institutions. Based on interviews with key members of former Yugoslavia's political elite, documents, and other primary sources, the book reconstructs the elite's motives and reasons for the actions that led to state collapse. Contrary to the dominant explanation of the collapse of Yugoslavia, the book argues that Yugoslavia did not collapse primarily because of the complexity of its ethnic structure, of changes in the international environment, or of a deep economic crisis. Although these factors provided the context in which the elite operated, it was the elite's perception of these problems that decisively influenced their decisions."--BOOK JACKET.