On the major European and Russian fronts throughout World War II, the challenge of crossing rivers under fire was absolutely central to any advance. The Panzers that crossed the Meuse at Sedan in May 1940 cut the French Army in two. The Wehrmacht's ability to cross the great rivers of the western USSR was vital to the lightning advances of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and in 1943–45 the Red Army had to drive the Germans back from a succession of river lines during their advance to the Reich, culminating in the Vistula and Oder lines. With World War II armies dependent on heavy mechanized equipment, the function which rivers played became essential for soldiers in all sides of the war. World War II River Assault Tactics details the methods, means and analysis of specific successes and failures. Featuring a wealth of wartime photos, particularly from German sources, and full-colour plates illustrating tactical scenarios, the subject is brought to life.

On the major European and Russian fronts throughout World War II, the challenge of crossing rivers under fire was absolutely central to any advance. The Panzers that crossed the Meuse at Sedan in May 1940 cut the French Army in two. The Wehrmacht's ability to cross the great rivers of the western USSR was vital to the lightning advances of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and in 1943–45 the Red Army had to drive the Germans back from a succession of river lines during their advance to the Reich, culminating in the Vistula and Oder lines. With World War II armies dependent on heavy mechanized equipment, the function which rivers played became essential for soldiers in all sides of the war. World War II River Assault Tactics details the methods, means and analysis of specific successes and failures. Featuring a wealth of wartime photos, particularly from German sources, and full-colour plates illustrating tactical scenarios, the subject is brought to life.

The US armed forces pioneered amphibious warfare in the Pacific and by the time of the D-day landings they had perfected the special equipment and tactics necessary for this extraordinarily difficult and risky form of warfare. This fact-packed study details the doctrine, equipment and tactics that evolved between the North African landings of November 1942 and those in the South of France in August 1944, and illustrates many aspects of the physical realities of assault landings through the use of photos, diagrams and color plates.

Crossing a river against a defending enemy force is a difficult and complex task for any army. History has shown that preparation is necessary to avoid disasters during this type of operation. In 2003, the Third Infantry Division crossed the Euphrates River because it was prepared for this task and possessed the necessary equipment. Since then, no other divisions or corps has executed river crossing operations. While the United States Army focused on counterinsurgency operations during the last twelve years, it underwent significant changes to adapt to meet the adversities on the battlefield. It transformed its war-fighting organizations, trained its corps and divisions with computer simulations, and relegated field training to brigade and below units. In addition, its current doctrine now refers to river crossings as the deliberate wet gap crossing. Because of these changes, many questions arose as to the present corps and divisions’ preparedness to do large-scale operations, to include its ability to plan, prepare, and execute the deliberate wet gap crossing. If called today, could these organizations conduct this complex operation? Examining river crossings in Europe during the Second World War was appropriate for insight into how the previous generation of corps and divisions prepared and executed such a complex task. After analyzing how these units were able to cross the numerous waterways in Europe, the present Army should consider reassessing its doctrine, training, and organization and equipment to prepare its units for future deliberate wet gap crossings.