This book describes and illustrates, in fascinating detail, the slow and painful learning curve followed by the Allies in the mid-war years as they attempted to end the Japanese stranglehold on Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Based on the actual wartime training documents and front-line memoirs, it shows how the British, Australian and US armies transformed their tactics, attitudes and equipment to master the art of jungle warfare. In 1944-45 the Allies finally conquered the jungle environment, exploiting their new strengths and their enemy's weaknesses, to win crushing victories in Burma and on the Pacific islands.

In a continuation of the tactics mini-series, this book analyzes the physical tactics of the close-quarter fighting that took place in ruined cities during World War II. Street-to-street fighting in cities was not a new development, but the bombed-out shells of cities and advances in weaponry meant that World War II took such strategies to a new level of savagery and violence. Packed with eye-witness accounts, tutorials from original training manuals, maps, and full-colour artwork, this is an eye-opening insight into the tactics and experiences of infantry fighting their way through ruined cities in the face of heavy casualty rates and vicious resistance.

This book describes and illustrates, in fascinating detail, the slow and painful learning curve followed by the Allies in the mid-war years as they attempted to end the Japanese stranglehold on Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Based on the actual wartime training documents and front-line memoirs, it shows how the British, Australian and US armies transformed their tactics, attitudes and equipment to master the art of jungle warfare. In 1944-45 the Allies finally conquered the jungle environment, exploiting their new strengths and their enemy's weaknesses, to win crushing victories in Burma and on the Pacific islands.

From 1940 to 1943 North Africa saw the first major desert campaign by modern mechanised armies. The British, Italians, German Afrika Korps and US Army all addressed and learned from the special problems human, logistical, mechanical and tactical of the desert environment, most significantly fighting in a terrain empty of resources and offering little chance of concealment. Paddy Griffith traces the fast-learned development in armour, artillery and infantry tactics in this exceptional arena and illustrates them with references to the major engagements in the North African theatre, which involved some of the greatest tacticians of World War II in one of the pivotal theatres.

British commandos are among the most celebrated soldiers of the Second World War. Their daring, ingenuity and bravery have given rise to an almost legendary reputation that makes it difficult to appreciate fully their role and their true value as fighting men.Stephen Bull, in this in-depth study of commando tactics and history, seeks to dispel the myths and the misunderstandings that surround them, and he places these elite troops of 70 years ago in the context of their times. He also demonstrates that the idea of the commando took time to develop and that commando operations were far from always successful. Commando tactics amphibious, mountain, close quarter were forged through the often-painful experience of raids and combined operations. And commando tactics and organization remained in a state of flux throughout the war as new situations and challenges arose.Stephen Bulls vivid account will be essential reading for anyone who is interested in commando fighting techniques and the early history of special forces.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.