From 1940 to 1943 North Africa saw the first major desert campaign by modern mechanised armies. The British, Italians, German Afrika Korps and US Army all addressed and learned from the special problems human, logistical, mechanical and tactical of the desert environment, most significantly fighting in a terrain empty of resources and offering little chance of concealment. Paddy Griffith traces the fast-learned development in armour, artillery and infantry tactics in this exceptional arena and illustrates them with references to the major engagements in the North African theatre, which involved some of the greatest tacticians of World War II in one of the pivotal theatres.

Firs published in 1991. "Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II" is an abridgment of a two-volume work that first appeared in 1952. Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript represents a collaborative attempt to determine as many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert warfare. Issues addressed include planning, intelligence, logistics, and operations. Described and analyzed are the German order of battle, the major military engagements in North Africa, and the particular problems of terrain and climate in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms. For this reason alone, as well as for the insights it offers, Desert Warfare requires the serious consideration of those responsible for preparing the U.S. military for any future conflict in desert terrain.

At the height of his power in January 1941 Hitler made the fateful decision to send troops to North Africa to save the beleaguered Italian army from defeat. Martin Kitchen's masterful history of the Axis campaign provides a fundamental reassessment of the key battles of 1941-3, Rommel's generalship, and the campaign's place within the broader strategic context of the war. He shows that the British were initially helpless against the operational brilliance of Rommel's Panzer divisions. However Rommel's initial successes and refusal to follow orders committed the Axis to a campaign well beyond their means. Without the reinforcements or supplies he needed to deliver a knockout blow, Rommel was forced onto the defensive and Hitler's Mediterranean strategy began to unravel. The result was the loss of an entire army which together with defeat at Stalingrad signalled a decisive shift in the course of the war.

Osprey's study of desert tactics employed in North Africa during World War II (1939-1945). In 1940-43 North Africa saw the first major desert campaign by modern mechanized armies. The British, Italians, German Afrika Korps and US Army all addressed and learned from the special problems - human, logistical, mechanical and tactical - of the desert environment, most significantly a terrain empty of resources and offering little chance of concealment. Paddy Griffith traces the fast-learning development of armor, artillery and infantry tactics in this exceptional situation and illustrates it using references to the major engagements in the North African theater, which involved some of the greatest tacticians of World War II in one of the pivotal arenas.

The battlefield interaction between infantry and tanks was central to combat on most fronts in World War II. The first 'Blitzkrieg' campaigns saw the tank achieve a new dominance. New infantry tactics and weapons – some of them desperately dangerous – had to be adopted, while the armies raced to develop more powerful anti-tank guns and new light weapons. By 1945, a new generation of revolutionary shoulder-fired AT weapons was in widespread use. This book explains in detail the shifting patterns of anti-tank combat, illustrated with photographs, diagrams and colour plates showing how weapons were actually employed on the battlefield.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

Osprey's examination of the 'Desert Rats', a popular nickname used to describe first 7th Armoured Division and then all the mixed body of British Commonwealth troops - British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian - that fought against Axis forces in North Africa between 1940 and 1943. For a long period during the early years of World War II (1939-1945), this was the only theatre of war where the United Kingdom could strike back against the Axis powers, and the seesaw desert war fought out along the coast of the Mediterranean in Egypt, Libya and then Tunisia proved a harsh testing ground for British arms - in terms of organization, equipment and methods of waging war. The distinctive dress, equipment and weapons developed and carried by the Desert Rats into battle will be examined as will the expansion, organization and training of the desert army. To illustrate the distinctive combat experience gained by the Desert Rats between 1940 and 1943, three representative operations will be examined in detail - Operation Compass in 1940, the battle of Gazala in May 1942 and finally the last phase of the decisive fighting at El Alamein in October-November 1942. Accompanied by full-color illustrations, this title will shed new light on these fascinating troops.