This book considers the important twentieth century Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his conception of certainty. In his work entitled On Certainty, Wittgenstein provides not only a brilliant solution to a previously intractable philosophical problem, but also the elements of an entirely new way of approaching this and similar longstanding, apparently unresolvable, problems. In On Certainty, he re-conceives the problem of radical skepticism-the claim that we can never really be certain of anything except the contents of our own minds-as a kind of philosophical "disease" of thought. His approach to the problem, which is emphasized in the book, is similar to the treatment of disease, has two main goals: (1) bring about an awareness in the philosopher that this kind of extreme skepticism is not a methodological approach to be taken seriously, and, with this awareness, (2) an attempt to replace this radical skepticism with a practical, Common Sense framework. Implicit in Wittgenstein's approach are a number of strategies found in a contemporary approach to psychotherapy known as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). These strategies, along with philosophical methods and scientific practices rooted in the Scottish School of Common Sense, seek to diagnose and treat irrational thoughts and beliefs that often emerge (and re-emerge) in the discipline of philosophy. The aim of this book, then, is to provide students of philosophy with the tools necessary to adjust and reshape these irrational, self-defeating thoughts and beliefs into something new, something healthy.

This book considers the important twentieth century Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his conception of certainty. In his work entitled On Certainty, Wittgenstein provides not only a brilliant solution to a previously intractable philosophical problem, but also the elements of an entirely new way of approaching this and similar longstanding, apparently unresolvable, problems. In On Certainty, he re-conceives the problem of radical skepticism–the claim that we can never really be certain of anything except the contents of our own minds–as a kind of philosophical “disease” of thought. His approach to the problem, which is emphasized in the book, is similar to the treatment of disease, has two main goals: (1) bring about an awareness in the philosopher that this kind of extreme skepticism is not a methodological approach to be taken seriously, and, with this awareness, (2) an attempt to replace this radical skepticism with a practical, Common Sense framework. Implicit in Wittgenstein’s approach are a number of strategies found in a contemporary approach to psychotherapy known as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). These strategies, along with philosophical methods and scientific practices rooted in the Scottish School of Common Sense, seek to diagnose and treat irrational thoughts and beliefs that often emerge (and re-emerge) in the discipline of philosophy. The aim of this book, then, is to provide students of philosophy with the tools necessary to adjust and reshape these irrational, self-defeating thoughts and beliefs into something new, something healthy.

Rush Rhees, a close friend of Wittgenstein and a major interpreter of his work, shows how Wittgenstein's On Certainty concerns logic, language, and reality – topics that occupied Wittgenstein since early in his career. Authoritative interpretation of Wittgenstein's last great work, On Certainty, by one of his closest friends. Debunks misconceptions about Wittgenstein's On Certainty and shows that it is an essay on logic. Exposes the continuity in Wittgenstein's thought, and the radical character of his conclusions. Contains a substantial and illuminating afterword discussing current scholarship surrounding On Certainty, and its relationship to Rhees's work on this subject.

This is the first collection of papers devoted to Ludwig Wittgenstein's cryptic but brilliant, On Certainty . This work, Wittgenstein's last, extends the thinking of his earlier, better known writings, and in so doing, makes the most important contribution to epistemology since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason - a claim the essays in this volume help to demonstrate. The essays have been grouped under four headings, reflecting current approaches to the work: the Framework, Transcendental, Epistemic, and Therapeutic readings.

The volume is full of thought-provoking insight which will prove a stimulus both to further study and to scholarly disagreement.

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein aims to demotivate philosophical theorizing by examining the conditions under which philosophical puzzlement arises. His goal is to enact this `therapy' without advancing controversial philosophical theories himself. The implementation of this new methodology distinguishes the late Wittgenstein from the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. After completing work on the Investigations, Wittgenstein continued to write philosophical remarks, including those published in On Certainty, until his death in 1951. Recently, some interpreters have called for the recognition of a third phase of Wittgenstein's career associated with On Certainty, during which Wittgenstein purportedly lost interest in the therapeutic goals of his second phase and adopted a systematic approach to classical epistemological problems. In this dissertation I challenge the idea of a `third Wittgenstein' by arguing that Wittgenstein retained his therapeutic aims in On Certainty - although he was not always successful in fulfilling his methodological goals. A survey of Wittgenstein's correspondence reveals that he consistently criticized the quality of his writing throughout the year 1950. Yet in the spring of 1951, just weeks before his death, Wittgenstein reported that he had regained his philosophical capacities and was doing his best work in years. These fluctuations in Wittgenstein's assessment of his writing correspond to the dates he underwent cancer treatments that affected his cognitive abilities. The results of philological investigation show that the first half of On Certainty was written during Wittgenstein's self-critical phase, while the second half was written during his final weeks of satisfactory work. The early remarks of the book contain a response to G.E. Moore's attempt to refute skepticism that is based on a theory of `hinge propositions'. Later in the book Wittgenstein implements a more therapeutic, less dogmatic method in his treatment of Moore. By exploring the ways that Moore's philosophical assertions can be used in everyday contexts, Wittgenstein wishes to lead us to question whether we fully understand what Moore is trying to say. I argue that Wittgenstein was satisfied by this latter response to Moore because it fulfilled the therapeutic and anti-theoretical aims of his later philosophy.