This book develops a new Wittgenstein interpretation called Wittgenstein’s Metametaphysics. The basic idea is that one major strand in Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy can be described as undermining the dichotomy between realism and idealism. The aim of this book is to contribute to a better understanding of the relation between language and reality and to open up avenues of dialogue to overcome deep divides in the research literature. In the course of developing a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation, the author provides fresh and original analyses of the latest issues in Wittgenstein scholarship and gives new answers to both major exegetical and philosophical problems. This makes the book an illuminating study for scholars and advanced students alike.

'The author conceives of the early and later Wittgenstein's attitude towards the realism-idealism controversy as the key for solving many crucial interpretive problems at one stroke. The book provides a very interesting and original contribution to Wittgenstein scholarship. All those who wish to deepen their understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole should read Bartmann's book.' - Pasquale Frascolla, Professor in Philosophy of Language, University of Naples Federico II, Italy 'We are seeing right now the emergence of a new generation of Wittgenstein scholarship which seeks to get beyond the positions and controversies of recent years. Marius Bartmann's clearly and compellingly argued book makes a valuable contribution to this changing debate by focusing on Wittgenstein's effort to overcome the dichotomy between realism and idealism. That perspective allows him to look in a new and illuminating fashion at Wittgenstein's early concern with the unity of the proposition and his later concern with the topic of rule-following.' - Hans Sluga, William and Trudy Ausfahl Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, UC Berkeley, USA This book develops a new Wittgenstein interpretation called Wittgenstein's Metametaphysics. The basic idea is that one major strand in Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy can be described as undermining the dichotomy between realism and idealism. The aim of this book is to contribute to a better understanding of the relation between language and reality and to open up avenues of dialogue to overcome deep divides in the research literature. In the course of developing a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation, the author provides fresh and original analyses of the latest issues in Wittgenstein scholarship and gives new answers to both major exegetical and philosophical problems. This makes the book an illuminating study for scholars and advanced students alike.

Wittgenstein's Metaphysics offers a radical new interpretation of the fundamental ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It takes issue with the conventional view that after 1930 Wittgenstein rejected the philosophy of the Tractatus and developed a wholly new conception of philosophy. By tracing the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas, Cook shows that they are neither as original nor as difficult as is often supposed. Wittgenstein was essentially an empiricist, and the difference between his early views (as set forth in the Tractatus) and the later views (as expounded in the Philosophical Investigations) lies chiefly in the fact that after 1930 he replaced his early version of reductionism with a subtler version. So he ended where he began, as an empiricist armed with a theory of meaning. This iconoclastic interpretation is sure to influence all future study of Wittgenstein and will provoke a reassessment of the nature of his contribution to philosophy.

Eli Hirsch has contributed steadily to metaphysics since his ground-breaking (and much cited) work on identity through time. This volume collects Hirsch's essays from the last decade (with the exception of one article from 1978) on ontology and metametaphysics which are very much tied to these debates.

Philosophers have spent millennia accumulating knowledge about knowledge. But negative epistemological phenomena, such as ignorance, falsity, and delusion, are persistently overlooked. Markus Gabriel argues that being wrong is part and parcel of subjectivity itself, adding a novel perspective on epistemic failures to the work of New Realism.

This book charts the evolution of metaphysics since Descartes and provides a compelling case for why metaphysics matters.