By exploring the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, Wittgenstein’s Later Theory of Meaning offers insights that will transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher. Explores the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, and offers new insights that transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher Provides original interpretations of the systematic points about language in Wittgenstein’s later writings that reveal his theory of meaning Engages in close readings of a variety of Wittgenstein’s later texts to explore what the philosopher really had to say about ‘kinds of words’ and ‘parts of speech’ Frees Wittgenstein from his reputation as an unsystematic thinker with nothing to offer but ‘therapy’ for individual cases of philosophical confusion

"Philosophy," wrote Wittgenstein, "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything." Hanfling takes seriously Wittgenstein's declaration of what he was doing, emphasizing Wittgenstein's rejection of theory and explanation in favor of 'description alone.' He demonstrates the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to long-standing problems about language, knowledge, the mind, and philosophy itself. The book exposes common misunderstandings about Wittgenstein, and examines in detail the celebrated 'private language' argument.

In the most comprehensive account to date of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of language, Alexander Stern explores the nature of meaning by putting Benjamin in dialogue with Wittgenstein. Known largely for his essays on culture, aesthetics, and literature, Walter Benjamin also wrote on the philosophy of language. This early work is famously obscure and considered hopelessly mystical by some. But for Alexander Stern, it contains important insights and anticipates—in some respects surpasses—the later thought of a central figure in the philosophy of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein. As described in The Fall of Language, Benjamin argues that “language as such” is not a means for communicating an extra-linguistic reality but an all-encompassing medium of expression in which everything shares. Borrowing from Johann Georg Hamann’s understanding of God’s creation as communication to humankind, Benjamin writes that all things express meanings, and that human language does not impose meaning on the objective world but translates meanings already extant in it. He describes the transformations that language as such undergoes while making its way into human language as the “fall of language.” This is a fall from “names”—language that responds mimetically to reality—to signs that designate reality arbitrarily. While Benjamin’s approach initially seems alien to Wittgenstein’s, both reject a designative understanding of language; both are preoccupied with Russell’s paradox; and both try to treat what Wittgenstein calls “the bewitchment of our understanding by means of language.” Putting Wittgenstein’s work in dialogue with Benjamin’s sheds light on its historical provenance and on the turn in Wittgenstein’s thought. Although the two philosophies diverge in crucial ways, in their comparison Stern finds paths for understanding what language is and what it does.

"Philosophy," wrote Wittgenstein, "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything." Hanfling takes seriously Wittgenstein's declaration of what he was doing, emphasizing Wittgenstein's rejection of theory and explanation in favor of 'description alone.' He demonstrates the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to long-standing problems about language, knowledge, the mind, and philosophy itself. The book exposes common misunderstandings about Wittgenstein, and examines in detail the celebrated 'private language' argument.

Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies consists of thirteen thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy the following essays fall into two classes: those that investigate connections between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and other philosophers and philosophical trends, and those which enter into some of the controversies that, over the last two decades, have raged over the interpretation of one aspect or another of Wittgenstein's writings. The connections that are explored include the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the humanistic and hermeneutic traditions in European philosophy, Wittgenstein's response to Frazer's Golden Bough and the interpretation of ritual actions, his attitude towards and criticisms of Frege (both in the Tractatus and in the later philosophy), the relationship between his ideas and those of members of the Vienna Circle on the matter of ostensive definition, and a comparison of Carnap's conception of the elimination of metaphysics and of Strawson's rehabilitation of metaphysics with Wittgenstein's later criticisms of metaphysics. The controversies into which Hacker enters include the Diamond-Conant interpretation of the Tractatus (which is shown to be inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus and with Wittgenstein's explanations of and comments on his book), Winch's interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule (which is demonstrated to be remote from Wittgenstein's intentions), and Malcolm's defence of the idea that Wittgenstein claimed that mastery of a language logically requires that the language be shared with other speakers. These far-ranging essays, several of them previously unpublished or difficult to find, shed much light upon different aspects of Wittgenstein's thought, and upon the controversies which it has stimulated.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression “form(s) of life” which translates into German as “Lebensform(en)” and “Form des Lebens”. The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on other scholears.