The story of the highly controversial First World War campaign that nearly destroyed Churchill's reputation for good and of his decades-long battle to set the record straight--a battle which ultimately helped clear the way for Churchill's appointment as Prime Minister in Britain's "darkest hour."

Acclaimed naval military expert Dan van der Vat argues that the disaster at the Dardanelles prolonged the war by two years, led to the Russian Revolution, forced Britain to the brink of starvation, and contributed to the destabilization of the Middle East. With never before published information on Colonel Geehl's mine laying operation, which won the battle for the Germans, The Dardanelles Disaster is essential reading for everyone interested in great naval history, Churchill's early career, and World War I.

The century that has elapsed since the 1915 Dardanelles campaign has done little to quell the debate that rages over its inglorious end. The origins of the campaign are likewise the subject of ongoing scrutiny, particularly the role of the First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, with whom the ill-fated campaign has been closely identified. Tom Curran’s The Grand Deception: Churchill and the Dardanelles presents a detailed examination of Churchill’s role in the decision-making process that led to the Gallipoli landings. Using unpublished British archival sources and a range of additional material, both contemporary and modern, Curran’s meticulous research casts new light on the lead-up to a campaign that would profoundly affect Australian military history.

The failed naval offensive to force a passage through the Straits of the Dardanelles in 1915 drove Winston Churchill from office in disgrace and nearly destroyed his political career. For over a century, the Dardanelles campaign has been mired in myth and controversy. Many believe it was fundamentally misconceived and doomed to fail, while others see it as a brilliant concept that might have dramatically shortened the First World War and saved millions of lives. Churchill is either the hero of the story, or the villain. Drawing on a wide range of original documents, Christopher M. Bell shows that both perspectives are flawed. Bell provides a detailed and authoritative account of the campaign's origins and execution, explaining why the naval attack was launched, why it failed, and how it was transformed into an even more disastrous campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula. He untangles Churchill's complicated relationship with Britain's admirals, politicians, and senior civil servants, and uncovers the machinations behind the bitter press campaign in 1915 to drive him from power. Churchill and the Dardanelles explores the origins of the myths surrounding the ill-fated campaign, and provides the first full account of Churchill's tireless efforts in the decades after 1915 to refute his legion of critics and convince the public that the Dardanelles campaign had nearly succeeded. Largely by his own exertions, Churchill ensured that the legacy of the Dardanelles would not stop him from becoming Prime Minister in 1940.

The first report to Parliament, published in early 1917, of the commission set up to review the Dardanelles campaign in which the British and their allies invaded the Gallipoli Peninsula during World War I (1914-18). The report was critical of the Cabinets conduct of the war and the urgent aim of the Commission was to prevent the war being lost. The second report is published in this series as, Defeat at Gallipoli: the Dardanelles Commission Part II, 1915-16.

This book completely rewrites the history of the origins of the Dardanelles Campaign and Winston Churchill's role in it, adding a new perspective to the military and political history of World War I. Churchill's Dilemma: The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign is an entirely original study of the origins of the disastrous Dardanelles Campaign of 1915 and Winston Churchill's role in it. The work challenges long-held beliefs about Churchill's actions as First Lord, including the perceptions that he had a preoccupation with the Dardanelles bordering on obsession, and that he only reluctantly promoted a naval-only attempt to force the Dardanelles because there were no troops available for a full-scale amphibious assault on the Peninsula. Opening with a brief study of prewar naval policy in the age of the mine and submarine and the implications of the growing threat from Germany, this in-depth study shows that neither perception is true. Churchill's preoccupation was with northern Europe, not the Mediterranean. He promoted his naval-only operation because he hoped this would preempt a major British military commitment to a southern theatre that would compromise his northern aspirations. In studying the motivations that drove and the other key players in this drama, this groundbreaking work does nothing less than unlock the true origins of the Dardanelles campaign.