This paper examines the relationship between fixed exchange rate arrangements and trade using a gravity model of international trade together with bilateral trade data from 24 countries from the Caribbean and Latin America for the period 1960-2001. The analysis indicates that a credible fixed peg has a positive impact on the value of bilateral trade. Moreover, the positive impact on trade is more pronounced with a stricter definition of the fixed peg or a longer duration of the peg. This supports the argument that the credibility of an exchange rate peg is an important element to determine bilateral trade. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that a currency union provides additional benefits.

This paper examines the impact of exchange rate regimes on bilateral trade while differentiating the effects of "words" and "deeds". Our findings-based on an extended database for de jure and de facto exchange rate classifications-show that while fixed exchange rate regimes increase trade, there is no systematic difference in the effects of policy announcements versus actions to maintain exchange rate stability. The trade generating effect of more stable exchange rate regimes is however more pronounced when words and actions are aligned, both in the short and long-run. Policy credibility therefore plays an important role in determining the effects of de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements such that deviations between the two could be costly. In addition, we find evidence that (i) the impact of hard pegs such as currency unions is broadly similar to that of conventional pegs; (ii) the currency union and direct peg effects evolve over time; and (iii) the effects of more stable regimes are heterogeneous across country groups.

"A classic argument for a fixed exchange rate is its promotion of trade. Empirical support for this, however, is mixed. While one branch of research consistently shows a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility on trade, another, more recent, branch presents evidence of a large positive impact of currency unions on trade. This paper helps resolve this disconnect. Our results, which use a new data-based classification of fixed exchange rate regimes, show a large, significant effect of a fixed exchange rate on bilateral trade between a base country and a country that pegs to it. Furthermore, the web of fixed exchange rates created when countries link to a common base also promotes trade, but only when these countries are part of a wider system, as during the Bretton Woods period. These results suggest an economically relevant role for exchange rate regimes in trade determination since a significant amount of world trade is conducted between countries with fixed exchange rates"--NBER website

In recent years, analysts and policy makers alike have been evaluating the nexus between exchange rates and macroeconomic stability. Among the most important questions is why have some countries adopted rigid, including fixed, exchange-rate paper addresses this question from a political economy perspective both theoretically and empirically. The model assumes that the monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that captures the trade-off between infla- tion and unemployment. This framework is initially applied to the case where monetary authorities must choose between a (permanently) fixed and a flexible exchange-rate regime. In choosing the regime it is assumed authorities compare the expected losses under each scenario. The model is subsequently extended extended to cover the somewhat more complicated case where the authoriities must choose between fixed-but-adjustable and flexible exchange-rate regimes. In this latter case, potential political costs of abandoningithe pegged rate are taken into account. In the empirical section, an unbalanced panel data set of 63 countries from 1980-1992 is used to estimate a series of probit models, with a binary exchange-rate regime index as the dependent variable. Among the most important explanatory variables were measures of countries' historical degree of political instability, measures of the probability of abandoning pegged rates, and variables related to the relative importance of real (unemployment) targets in the preferences of monetary authorities. The regression results support the political economy approach developed in the theoretical discussion.

This book examines monetary policy, central banking and exchange rate regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. Part I covers central banking and monetary policy, while Part II covers monetary policy and exchange rate regimes. Some chapters focus on the monetary frameworks of particular countries, including Lebanon, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey, outlining the different systems operated in each case, considering their successes and failures, and discussing important issues such as government policy, macroeconomic performance, inflation and inflation targeting, central bank independence and the impact of broader political economic developments on the conduct of monetary policy. Other chapters cover thematic issues across the whole region, including: central bank independence, operations of debtor central banks, the effect of exchange rates on inflation, and the effect on countries’ trade of alternative exchange rate regimes. Drawing on the insights of scholars and policy-makers, this book is a vital resource for anyone wanting to understand the economies of the Middle East and North Africa.