The yearly volumes of Censored, in continuous publication since 1976 and since 1995 available through Seven Stories Press, is dedicated to the stories that ought to be top features on the nightly news, but that are missing because of media bias and self-censorship. The top stories are listed democratically in order of importance according to students, faculty, and a national panel of judges. Each of the top stories is presented at length, alongside updates from the investigative reporters who broke the stories.

'Restoring the First-century Church in the Twenty-first Century: Essays on the Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement in Honor of Don Haymes' is a snap-shot of a major American religious movement just after the turn of the millennium. When the ÒDisciplesÓ of Alexander Campbell and the ÒChristiansÓ of Barton Warren Stone joined forces early in the 19th century, the first indigenous ecumenical movement in the United States came into being. Two hundred years later, this American experiment in biblical primitivism has resulted in three, possibly four, large segments. Best known is the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), active wherever ecumenical Christians gather. The denomination is typically theologically open, having been reshaped by theological Liberalism and the Social Gospel in the twentieth century, and has been re-organized on the model of other Protestant bodies. The largest group, the Churches of Christ, easily distinguished by their insistence on 'a cappella' music (singing only), is theologically conservative, now tending towards the evangelical, and congregationally autonomous, though with a denominational sense of brotherhood. The Christian Churches/Churches of Christ (Independent) are a 'via media' between the two other bodies: theologically conservative and evangelical, congregationally autonomous, pastorally oriented, and comfortable with instrumental music. The fourth numerically significant group, the churches of Christ (Anti-Institutional), is a conservative reaction to the 'a cappella' churches, much in the way that the Southern ''a capella' churches reacted against the emerging intellectual culture and social location, instrumental music and institutional centrism of the Northern Disciples following the Civil War. Besides these four, numerous smaller fragments, typically one-article splinter groups, decorate the history of the Restoration Movement: One-Cup brethren, Premillennialists, No-Sunday-School congregations, No-Located-Preacher churches, and others. This movement to unite Christians on the basis of faith and immersion in Jesus Christ, and to restore New-Testament Christianity, is too little recognized on the American religious landscape, and it has been too little studied by the academic community. This volume is focused primarily on the 'a cappella' churches and their interests, but implications for the entire Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement abound. The voices that speak freely within were unimpeded in authoring these essays by standards of orthodoxy imposed from without. All of the contributors are acquainted with Don Haymes, the honoree of the volume, and have been inspired by this friend and colleague, a man with a rigorous and earthy intellect and a heavenly spirit. David Bundy, series editor Studies in the History and Culture of World Christianities

Americans are greatly concerned about the number of our troops killed in battle--33,000 in the Korean War; 58,000 in Vietnam; 4,500 in Iraq--and rightly so. But why are we so indifferent, often oblivious, to the far greater number of casualties suffered by those we fight and those we fight for? This is the compelling, largely unasked question John Tirman answers in The Deaths of Others. Between six and seven million people died in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq alone, the majority of them civilians. And yet Americans devote little attention to these deaths. Other countries, however, do pay attention, and Tirman argues that if we want to understand why there is so much anti-Americanism around the world, the first place to look is how we conduct war. We understandably strive to protect our own troops, but our rules of engagement with the enemy are another matter. From atomic weapons and carpet bombing in World War II to napalm and daisy cutters in Vietnam and beyond, our weapons have killed large numbers of civilians and enemy soldiers. Americans, however, are mostly ignorant of these methods, believing that American wars are essentially just, necessary, and "good." Trenchant and passionate, The Deaths of Others forces readers to consider the tragic consequences of American military action not just for Americans, but especially for those we fight against.

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

Thousands of Iraqi civilians were killed or injured during the three weeks of fighting from the first air strikes on March 20 to April 9, 2003, when Baghdad fell to U.S.-led coalition forces. Human rights investigated the conduct of the war during a five-week mission in Iraq. This report documents Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law, including use of human shields, abuse of the red cross and red crescent emblems, use of antipersonnel landmines, location of military objects in protected places, and failure to take adequate precautions to protect civilians from the dangers resulting from military operations.

A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.

Gulf War, Frank Smyth