This review of the Suez Crisis gives a chapter each to such key players as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Secretary to the Cabinet. It incorporates 1956 releases from the Public Record Office to reassess the role of officials and the process of policymaking.

This radically new work provides an innovative approach to the question of why the Suez Crisis erupted. Bertjan Verbeek here applies foreign policy analysis framework to British decision making during the crisis, providing the first full foreign policy analysis of this important event. Moreover, the book offers a new interpretation on British decision-making during the crisis. Many existing studies of Suez emphasise the role of the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and often focus on the matter of collusion with Israel. This study demonstrates that small group dynamics in the institutional context of cabinet decision-making in the British political system are much more important. This study offers the possibility of determining more precisely the interrelationship between systemic constraints on states' behaviour and the actual behaviour of states under such constraints.

In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser.

This introduction to Suez covers the background to the crisis, the invasion, and its aftermath. The Suez-Crisis provides: * key documents, as primary sources, incorporated in the text * an extensive range of other source material, including images * analysis of the significance of the sources discussed, and their usefulness as historical evidence * commentary on the historical context of the crisis * an analysis of the wider implications of the crisis, particularly for Britain

Making extensive use of official material which has recently been released, Carlton provides a succinct account of the rupture which the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the British response to it caused in Anglo-American relations. Acidic paper. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Why did the Suez War ever come to pass? Why did Eden, against public opinion and without sufficient military capability, decide to invade Egypt? When Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, Britain and France reacted dramatically, beginning a chain of events that ultimately led to war. But why did Nasser nationalize the canal in the first place? And what part did the United States of America play in sparking the conflict that resulted in war? Paul Johnson skilfully and clearly explains the roots of the war, the many different political factors involved, the resultant invasion and its repercussions. First published in 1957, The Suez War walks us through a conflict that many historians feel should never have taken place, and one that Johnson argues has exposed '[t]he real weakness of Britain – never again can we play our unique and honourable role as keeper of the world's conscience.'

An account of the 1956 Suez Crisis written by the UK Minister of State for Foreign Affairs who resigned in protest against British involvement in the invasion of Egypt.