“Engrossing and illuminating.” —Arthur Herman, Wall Street Journal When Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the United States and NATO were losing the Cold War. The USSR had superiority in conventional weapons and manpower in Europe, and it had embarked on a massive program to gain naval preeminence. But Reagan already had a plan to end the Cold War without armed conflict. In this landmark narrative, former navy secretary John Lehman reveals the untold story of the naval operations that played a major role in winning the Cold War.

The latest edition of Warship, the celebrated annual publication featuring the latest research on the history, development, and service of the world's warships. For over 45 years, Warship has been the leading annual resource on the design, development, and deployment of the world's combat ships. Featuring a broad range of articles from a select panel of distinguished international contributors, this latest volume combines original research, new book reviews, warship notes, an image gallery, and much more, maintaining the impressive standards of scholarship and research with which Warship has become synonymous. Detailed and accurate information is the keynote of all the articles, which are fully supported by plans, data tables, and stunning photographs. This year's Warship includes features on the secret battleship design that Mussolini's Fascist Italy sold to Stalin's USSR, the little-known German flak ships of World War II, the French aircraft carriers Clemenceau and Foch, and the development of electronic warfare in the Royal Navy.

As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy's naval strategy system from the post-World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s' maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred -ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy's maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year "strategy of means" where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force's ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy's ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post-Cold War era.

The national conversation regarding the United States Navy has, for far too long, been focused on the popular question of how many ships does the service need? "To Provide and Maintain a Navy," a succinct but encompassing treatise on sea power by Dr. Henry J "Jerry" Hendrix, goes beyond the numbers to reveal the crucial importance of Mare Liberum (Free Sea) to the development of the Western thought and the rules based order that presently governs the global commons that is the high seas. Proceeding from this philosophical basis, Hendrix explores how a "free sea" gave way to free trade and the central role sea borne commercial trade has played in the overall rise in global living standards. This is followed by analysis of how the relative naval balance of power has played out in terms of naval battles and wars over the centuries and how the dominance of the United States Navy following World War II has resulted in seven decades of unprecedented peace on the world's oceans. He further considers how, in the years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, both China and Russia began laying the groundwork to challenge the United States maritime leadership and upend five centuries of naval precedents in order to establish a new approach to sovereignty over the world's seas. It is only at this point that Dr. Hendrix approaches the question of the number of ships required for the United States Navy, the industrial base required to build them, and the importance of once again aligning the nation's strategic outlook to that of a "seapower" in order to effectively and efficiently address the rising threat. "To Provide and Maintain a Navy" is brief enough to be read in a weekend but deep enough to inform the reader as to the numerous complexities surrounding what promises to be the most important strategic conversation facing the United States as it enters a new age of great power competition with not one, but two nations who seek nothing less than to close and control the world's seas.

This report is an exploration of possible alternatives to potentially replace the U.S. Navy's legacy aircraft carrier force as it begins reaching expected service life. This is neither a formal analysis of alternatives nor detailed engineering study.