This book contends that the housing markets and shadow banking have been involved in a kind of 'dance' over the last two decades. It traces this dance to be between the roles of mortgage markets since the 1980s in both the US and China and the developments of securitization and 'shadow banks.' It gives side-by-side comparisons between the two and suggests that house price dynamics have been similar, but also quite different. Both had booms. The US had a bubble that burst around 2007 — after prices became quite high relative to rents and then crashed. However, Chinese housing markets, which had a similar run-up, did not have a burst bubble. Rather, the rising property values appear to have been from space becoming more valuable as reflected in rent growth. In the US, prices chased prices; in China, prices chased rents.Mortgage markets were more complicated, beginning with the securitization in the US, and the rise of shadow banks that both led and followed. The US used shadow banks to hold pieces of securitization deals and funded them with deposit-like debt. These pieces were fragile and their collapse caused 'silent runs,' which were instrumental in the ensuing crash. China's shadow banks were more like traditional intermediaries, unattached to securitization. Their liabilities were mostly not short-term, as was the case with US shadow banks. So, runs were not a problem, but getting the market to work efficiently was.The markets have evolved. And while the music has changed, the dance is not over.

Why America's public-private mortgage giants threaten the world economy—and what to do about it The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to $150 billion, and substantially more will be needed. The U.S. economy--and by extension, the global financial system--has a lot riding on Fannie and Freddie. They cannot fail, yet that is precisely what these mortgage giants are guaranteed to do. How can we limit the damage to our economy, and avoid making the same mistakes in the future? Guaranteed to Fail explains how poorly designed government guarantees for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to the debacle of mortgage finance in the United States, weighs different reform proposals, and provides sensible, practical recommendations. Despite repeated calls for tougher action, Washington has expanded the scope of its guarantees to Fannie and Freddie, fueling more and more housing and mortgages all across the economy--and putting all of us at risk. This book unravels the dizzyingly immense, highly interconnected businesses of Fannie and Freddie. It proposes a unique model of reform that emphasizes public-private partnership, one that can serve as a blueprint for better organizing and managing government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In doing so, Guaranteed to Fail strikes a cautionary note about excessive government intervention in markets.

There is much confusion about what shadow banking is. Some equate it with securitization, others with non-traditional bank activities, and yet others with non-bank lending. Regardless, most think of shadow banking as activities that can create systemic risk. This paper proposes to describe shadow banking as “all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. Backstops can come in the form of franchise value of a bank or insurance company, or in the form of a government guarantee. The need for a backstop is in our view a crucial feature of shadow banking, which distinguishes it from the “usual” intermediated capital market activities, such as custodians, hedge funds, leasing companies, etc.

The evolution of risk management has resulted from the interplay of financial crises, risk management practices, and regulatory actions. In the 1970s, research lay the intellectual foundations for the risk management practices that were systematically implemented in the 1980s as bond trading revolutionized Wall Street. Quants developed dynamic hedging, Value-at-Risk, and credit risk models based on the insights of financial economics. In parallel, the Basel I framework created a level playing field among banks across countries. Following the 1987 stock market crash, the near failure of Salomon Brothers, and the failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert, in 1996 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the Market Risk Amendment to the Basel I Capital Accord; the amendment went into effect in 1998. It led to a migration of bank risk management practices toward market risk regulations. The framework was further developed in the Basel II Accord, which, however, from the very beginning, was labeled as being procyclical due to the reliance of capital requirements on contemporaneous volatility estimates. Indeed, the failure to measure and manage risk adequately can be viewed as a key contributor to the 2008 global financial crisis. Subsequent innovations in risk management practices have been dominated by regulatory innovations, including capital and liquidity stress testing, macroprudential surcharges, resolution regimes, and countercyclical capital requirements.

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The financial crisis of 2007-09 highlighted the changing role of financial institutions and the growing importance of the ¿shadow banking system,¿ which grew out of the securitization of assets and the integration of banking with capital market developments. In a market-based financial system, banking and capital market developments are inseparable, and funding conditions are tied closely to fluctuations in the leverage of market-based financial intermediaries. This report describes the changing nature of financial intermediation in the market-based financial system, charts the course of the recent financial crisis, and outlines the policy responses that have been implemented by the Fed. Reserve and other central banks. Charts and tables.