Abstract: Creditor-friendly laws are generally associated with more credit to the private sector and deeper financial markets. But laws mean little if they are not upheld in the courts. The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of creditor rights is strongly linked to the efficiency of contract enforcement. This hypothesis is tested using firm level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 2005. The analysis finds that firms have more access to bank credit in countries with better creditor rights, but the association between creditor rights and bank credit is much weaker in countries with inefficient courts. Exploiting the panel dimension of the data and the fact that creditor rights change over time, the authors show that the effect of a change in creditor rights on change in bank credit increases with court enforcement. In particular, a unit increase in the creditor rights index will increase the share of bank loans in firm investment by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the enforcement time distribution (Lithuania). However, the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 80th percentile of this distribution (Kyrgyzstan). Legal protections of creditors and efficient courts are strong complements.

Creditor-friendly laws are generally associated with more credit to the private sector and deeper financial markets. But laws mean little if they are not upheld in the courts. The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of creditor rights is strongly linked to the efficiency of contract enforcement. This hypothesis is tested using firm level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 2005. The analysis finds that firms have more access to bank credit in countries with better creditor rights, but the association between creditor rights and bank credit is much weaker in countries with inefficient courts. Exploiting the panel dimension of the data and the fact that creditor rights change over time, the authors show that the effect of a change in creditor rights on change in bank credit increases with court enforcement. In particular, a unit increase in the creditor rights index will increase the share of bank loans in firm investment by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the enforcement time distribution (Lithuania). However, the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 80th percentile of this distribution (Kyrgyzstan). Legal protections of creditors and efficient courts are strong complements.

Creditor Rights and the Public Interest supports the greater representation of non-traditional creditors in the process of insolvency restructuring in Canada, concentrating particularly on restructuring under the federal Companies' Creditors' Arrangement Act (CCAA). Arguing in favour of the representation of such non-traditional creditors as workers, consumers, trade suppliers, and local governments, Janis Sarra describes the existing process of addressing their interests, analyzes four case studies that focus on non-creditor groups, and compares the Canadian approach to that of several other countries, such as Germany, France, and the United States. Sarra draws on a comprehensive body of academic literature that covers a broad range of issues--insolvency theory, corporate governance theory, legislative history, and bankruptcy and insolvency practice. She further surveys the relevant legislation and supplements her analysis with insights drawn from extensive primary research of court records and personal interviews with lawyers, judges, and government officials. Creditor Rights and the Public Interest ultimately illustrates the way in which the concept of the public interest can be utilized to foreground the concerns of non-traditional stakeholders. Sarra provides a coherent account of the justification for recognizing these creditors by situating insolvency law in a legal regime that realizes a duty to maximize all of the interests and investments at stake in the corporation. In an academic field where scholarship is currently scarce, Sarra's text will be a welcome contribution.

The problem of enforcing a money judgment exists in every legal system in the world, but the methods and orientation vary significantly. Effective enforcement proceedings are crucial to ensure full access to justice for creditors. Complete and full knowledge of the debtors’ assets is crucial to choose the appropriate enforcement measure. But each legal system must balance the creditors’ rights to an efficient enforcement with the debtors’ rights. The wide differences between enforcement proceedings mirror the way each society tries to find a balance between confronting rights and interests. This book explores and compares how different legal systems approach these issues with a focus on the discovery of debtors’ assets, which is a common problem for enforcement and execution proceedings in almost every jurisdiction. This is the first book to compare enforcement proceedings around the world and presents a variety of information and country reports from leading experts from four continents. It represents the joint work of academic and legal authorities from Germany, Japan, Korea, France, the UK, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Poland, Russia, Greece, North America, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the EU.