Since the 1960s, America's policymaking system has transitioned from one in which leaders like Lyndon Johnson could simply disparage the concept of budget projections to one in which policymakers consciously manipulate cost estimates. Paradoxically, the very safeguards put in place to thwart economically unsound legislation now cause chaos by incentivizing the development of flawed, even blatantly unworkable, policies. As Robert Saldin shows in When Bad Policy Makes Good Politics, the pathologies of the new system are illustrated by the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act and its role in aiding passage of President Obama's landmark health reform law. CLASS was supposed to bring much needed relief of America's dysfunctional long-term care system, but critics argued that its flawed design rendered the program unviable. However, what appeared to be a naïve proposal was actually a carefully framed policy designed to fit the rules of the game, particularly the Congressional Budget Office's cost-projection process. Although CLASS was destined for a "death spiral" requiring massive government bailouts, the CBO estimated it would save tens of billions of dollars. These official "savings" made CLASS an appealing add-on to the Affordable Care Act. But when the Obama administration later announced that CLASS was impossible to implement, America's long-term care system was left in crisis. This skillful examination of CLASS and the machinations of Congress provides insight into how the contemporary policymaking process really functions.

Explains the theory of political survival, particularly in cases of dictators and despotic governments, arguing that political leaders seek to stay in power using any means necessary, most commonly by attending to the interests of certain coalitions.

Since the 1960s, America's policymaking system has transitioned from one in which leaders like Lyndon Johnson could simply disparage the concept of budget projections to one in which policymakers consciously manipulate cost estimates. Paradoxically, the very safeguards put in place to thwart economically unsound legislation now cause chaos by incentivizing the development of flawed, even blatantly unworkable, policies. As Robert Saldin shows in When Bad Policy Makes Good Politics, the pathologies of the new system are illustrated by the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act and its role in aiding passage of President Obama's landmark health reform law. CLASS was supposed to bring much needed relief of America's dysfunctional long-term care system, but critics argued that its flawed design rendered the program unviable. However, what appeared to be a naïve proposal was actually a carefully framed policy designed to fit the rules of the game, particularly the Congressional Budget Office's cost-projection process. Although CLASS was destined for a "death spiral" requiring massive government bailouts, the CBO estimated it would save tens of billions of dollars. These official "savings" made CLASS an appealing add-on to the Affordable Care Act. But when the Obama administration later announced that CLASS was impossible to implement, America's long-term care system was left in crisis. This skillful examination of CLASS and the machinations of Congress provides insight into how the contemporary policymaking process really functions.

One of the primary reasons that otherwise good politicians enact bad policies in countries all over the world, but especially in low-income countries, is that they face significant constraints in their efforts to bring about reform. These constraints, the "room for maneuver", are shaped by the degree of social cohesion in a country and the quality of its institution.

Building on a deep theoretical foundation and drawing on numerous examples, we examine how policies spread across the American states. We argue that for good policies to spread while bad policies are pushed aside, states must learn from one another. The three ingredients for this positive outcome are observable experiments, time to learn, and favorable incentives and expertise among policymakers. Although these ingredients are sometimes plentiful, we also note causes for concern, such as when policies are complex or incompatible with current practices, when policymakers give in to underlying political biases, or when political institutions lack the capacity for cultivating expertise. Under such conditions, states may rely on competition, imitation, and coercion, rather than learning, which can allow bad policies, rather than good ones, to spread. We conclude with lessons for reformers and policymakers and an assessment of our overall argument based on state responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

With a level-headed voice, leading policy strategist Clarke Forsythe speaks clearly into the fray of political striving. Here he campaigns for a recovery of a rich understanding of the virtue of prudence, and for its application by policymakers and citizens to contemporary public policy. As Forsythe explains, prudence, in its classical sense, is the ability to apply wisdom to right action. In this book he explores the importance of applying the principles of prudence--taking account of limitations in a world of constraints and striving to achieve the greatest measure of justice under current circumstances--to the realm of politics, especially that of bioethics. In particular, Forsythe applies these concepts to the ongoing debate among pro-life advocates regarding gradual versus radical change as the most effective way to achieve political and legislative goals. Drawing on the Bible, philosophy, and the wisdom of historical figures such as Abraham Lincoln and William Wilberforce, he makes a strong case for a strategy of seeking to achieve the maximal change possible at a given time--or political prudence. As such, it has broad implications for political scientists and strategists both within and beyond the pro-life context.

Since the 1960s, America's policymaking system has transitioned from one in which leaders like Lyndon Johnson could simply disparage the concept of budget projections to one in which policymakers consciously manipulate cost estimates. Paradoxically, the very safeguards put in place to thwart economically unsound legislation now cause chaos by incentivizing the development of flawed, even blatantly unworkable, policies. As Robert Saldin shows in When Bad Policy Makes Good Politics, the pathologies of the new system are illustrated by the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act and its role in aiding passage of President Obama's landmark health reform law. CLASS was supposed to bring much needed relief of America's dysfunctional long-term care system, but critics argued that its flawed design rendered the program unviable. However, what appeared to be a naïve proposal was actually a carefully framed policy designed to fit the rules of the game, particularly the Congressional Budget Office's cost-projection process. Although CLASS was destined for a "death spiral" requiring massive government bailouts, the CBO estimated it would save tens of billions of dollars. These official "savings" made CLASS an appealing add-on to the Affordable Care Act. But when the Obama administration later announced that CLASS was impossible to implement, America's long-term care system was left in crisis. This skillful examination of CLASS and the machinations of Congress provides insight into how the contemporary policymaking process really functions.