We present an analysis of the sensitivity of household mortgage probabilities of default (PDs) and loss given default (LGDs) on unemployment rates, house price growth, interest rates, and other drivers. A structural micro-macro simulation model is used to that end. It is anchored in the balance sheets and income-expense flow data from about 95,000 households and 230,000 household members from 21 EU countries and the U.S. We present country-specific nonlinear regressions based on the structural model simulation-implied relation between PDs and LGDs and their drivers. These can be used for macro scenario-conditional forecasting, without requiring the conduct of the micro simulation. We also present a policy counterfactual analysis of the responsiveness of mortgage PDs, LGDs, and bank capitalization conditional on adverse scenarios related to the COVID-19 pandemic across all countries. The economics of debt moratoria and guarantees are discussed against the background of the model-based analysis.

How has European Private Law responded to the property and mortgage markets crisis? And in what way is this reaction likely to model domestic systems? The financial and economic crisis that marked the beginning of the century has had a devastating effect on the property and mortgage markets in many Member States of the European Union. Despite this, the European legislator took its time to respond. This book analyzes the impact of the Mortgage Credit Directive (Directive 2014/17) in twelve different jurisdictions: Belgium, England, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. The reports show how in some instances only certain products (such as foreign currency loans) or practices (irresponsible lending, homeownership promoting policies, the use of unfair terms) were factors that triggered the property crash; in other cases; the system completely failed to address an exceptional situation; and, finally, how in some instances prudent lending explained why the market was virtually not hit at all. This book aims to find out whether the two goals of Directive 2014/17 (financial sector stability and enhanced consumer protection) can be achieved in light of its provisions and of the transposition carried out by the different Member States, and whether the changes it introduces have a significant impact in the jurisdictions considered here. Some systems are already showing signs of yet another property bubble. There is room for hope: perhaps we have learned from the past, perhaps the Directive is a step forward, but more importantly this book shows that we can learn from each other. [Subject: European Law, Private Law, Property Law]

CM became a popular borrowing instrument during the bullish housing market of the early 2000s but vanished rapidly during the subsequent downturn. These non-traditional loans (interest only, negative amortization, and teaser mortgages) enable households to postpone loan repayment compared to traditional mortgages and hence relax borrowing constraints. But, they increase household leverage and heighten dependence on mortgage refinancing. CM were chosen by prime borrowers with high income levels seeking to purchase expensive houses relative to their incomes. Borrowers with CM experience substantially higher ex post default rates than borrowers with traditional mortgages with similar characteristics. Illus. This is a print on demand report.

Concerns about excessive variability in bank risk weights have prompted their review by regulators. This paper provides prima facie evidence on the extent of risk weight heterogeneity across broad asset classes and by country of counterparty for major banks in the European Union using internal models. It also finds that corporate risk weights are sensitive to the riskiness of an average representative firm, but not to a market indicator of a firm’s probablity of default. Under plausible yet severe hypothetical scenarios for harmonized risk weights, counterfactual capital ratios would decline significantly for some banks, but they would not experience a shortfall relative to Basel III’s minimum requirements. This, however, does not preclude falling short of meeting additional national supervisory capital requirements.

The events of the past six months have demonstrated the fragility of the global financial system and raised fundamental questions about the effectiveness of the response by private and public sector institutions. the report assesses the vulnerabilities that the system is facing and offers tentative conclusions and policy lessons. the report reflects information available up to March 21, 2008.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

Takes a skeptical look at a leading argument about what is causing the foreclosure crisis and what should be done to stop it. The authors focus on two key decisions: the borrower's choice to default on a mortgage and the lender's subsequent choice whether to renegotiate or modify the loan. Unaffordable loans, defined as those with high mortgage payments relative to income at origination, are unlikely to be the main reason that borrowers decide to default. The efficiency of foreclosure for investors is a more plausible explanation for the low number of modifications to date. Policies designed to reduce foreclosures should focus on ameliorating the effects of job loss rather than modifying loans to make them more affordable on a long-term basis. Illustrations.