General Rowland Hill, 1st Viscount Hill of Almarez was imaginative, brave – and perhaps more surprisingly for the period in which he lived an d fought – compassionate towards those under his command. He was a man who frequently led from the front in some of the deadliest battles ofthe Napoleonic Wars. Hill was given his own ‘detached’ corps and fought his way through Spain, Portugal and France, winning battles against the odds – such at St Pierre, where he defeated the redoubtable Maréchal Soult when outnumbered two to one. When ministers at home asked that Hill be allowed to leave the Peninsula and lead an army elsewhere, Wellington dismissed the idea with ‘Would you cut off my right hand?’ Hill fought at Roliça, Corunna, Talavera, Bussaco, Almarez, Vitoria and Waterloo. He succeeded the Duke in 1828 as Commander-in-Chief. Based upon theHill papers made available to Joanna Hill – the General’s great, great, great niece – and a wide range of other primary sources, Wellington’s Right Hand is an important addition to the literature of the Napoleonic age and in particular to that of the Peninsular War.

One of the most unlikely soldiers of his day, General Rowland Hill, 1st Viscount Hill of Almarez was imaginative, brave – and perhaps more surprisingly for the period in which he lived and fought – compassionate towards those under his command. This is the compelling story of one of history's forgotten heroes, a man who frequently led from the front in some of the deadliest battles of the Napoleonic Wars. Hill was given his own 'detached' corps and fought his way through Spain, Portugal and France, winning battles against the odds – such at St Pierre, where he defeated the redoubtable Marechal Soult when outnumbered two to one. When ministers at home asked that Hill be allowed to leave the Peninsula and lead an army elsewhere, Wellington dismissed the idea with 'Would you cut off my right hand?' Hill fought at Roliça, Corunna, Talavera, Bussaco, Almarez, Vitoria and Waterloo. He succeeded the Duke in 1828 as Commander-in-Chief of the forces and served as such until he resigned in 1842, a period marked by civil unrest that he reluctantly was obliged to confront. Based upon the Hill papers and a wide range of other primary sources, Wellington's Right Hand is an important addition to the literature of the Napoleonic age and in particular to that of the Peninsular War. Writer and historian Joanna Hill is the great, great, great niece of Rowland Hill and as such has gained unique access to the Hill family archives. In April 2005, she published her first book on the Hill family, The Hills of Hawkstone and Attingham; the Rise, Shine and Decline of a Shropshire Family. Serendipity has sometimes led her life in the footsteps of her illustrious ancestor. While working at the Institute of Fine Arts, New York University's post graduate department for the history of art and archaeology, she spent three very hot seasons excavating in the Nile Delta of Egypt, a few kilometres from the site of one of the General's very first battles, at Aboukir in 1801. She currently lives with her husband (and an international champion Skye terrier, Dougal) in a 13th-century hilltop bastide village in South West France. This is just a short distance north of St Pierre d'Irube at the foot of the Pyrenees, where Rowland Hill won his very own general action in the closing stages of the Peninsular War in December 1813. When the victorious British cavalry rode home through France from Toulouse to the channel ports in May the following year, they must have passed by.

Alexander Gordon served as aide-de-camp to his uncle, Sir David Baird, in the Coruna campaign of 1808-9, then joined Wellington's staff and remained at his side through to the Waterloo campaign. His letters, presented here, offer a unique insight into the British campaigns in the Peninsula.

A dual biography of the greatest opposing generals of their age who ultimately became fixated on one another, by a bestselling historian. 'Thoroughly enjoyable, beautifully written and meticulously researched' Observer On the morning of the battle of Waterloo, the Emperor Napoleon declared that the Duke of Wellington was a bad general, the British were bad soldiers and that France could not fail to win an easy victory. Forever afterwards historians have accused him of gross overconfidence, and massively underestimating the calibre of the British commander opposed to him. Andrew Roberts presents an original, highly revisionist view of the relationship between the two greatest captains of their age. Napoleon, who was born in the same year as Wellington - 1769 - fought Wellington by proxy years earlier in the Peninsula War, praising his ruthlessness in private while publicly deriding him as a mere 'sepoy general'. In contrast, Wellington publicly lauded Napoleon, saying that his presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men, but privately wrote long memoranda lambasting Napoleon's campaigning techniques. Although Wellington saved Napoleon from execution after Waterloo, Napoleon left money in his will to the man who had tried to assassinate Wellington. Wellington in turn amassed a series of Napoleonic trophies of his great victory, even sleeping with two of the Emperor's mistresses.

This classic account of Wellington s tactics and strategy in the Peninsular War is one of the best single-volume works ever written on the epic campaign. Jac Weller covers all the battles with the French in which Wellington was involved. Talavera, Busaco, Salamanca and Vitoria are among the famous battles that he brings to life once more, with the aid of meticulous research, extensive visits to and photographs of the battlefields themselves, and an unwavering ability to cut a clear path through tangled military events. Wellington in the Peninsula brilliantly demonstrates how a great commander finally achieved victory after six years of battle against Napoleon s army.

This book at last makes available in English a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men had vast experience in the Napoleonic Wars, and both were prominent participants in the campaign. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army; the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to author VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. He also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history, via the work of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück. Oddly, Clausewitz's study of the campaign of 1815 was never published in English, and Wellington's once-famous response to it has been strangely but studiously ignored by British military historians since 1914. Hence this book. It contains Wellington's initial battle report; Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife Marie; correspondence within Wellington's circle concerning Clausewitz's work; Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (not just the Battle of Waterloo); Wellington's memorandum in response; and enlightening essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Battle of Waterloo. Major General [U.S. Army] David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., writes in the April 2011 edition of The Journal of Military History: "Long overdue, we now have two English translations of [Clausewitz's] The Campaign of 1815 [i.e., Peter Hofschröer's translation of Clausewitz's study and Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow's edition of the full Clausewitz-Wellington exchange]. Either of these volumes would be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any serious student of military affairs, but On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 is clearly the richer of the two." Napoleonic expert Bruno Colson wrote [in War in History 19(3)] that Pedlow "convincingly resurrects Wellington's ideas and actions, and gives a final and excellent reply to the arguments of Peter Hofschröer, while remaining balanced, recognizing the latter's merits and quoting him courteously. Waterloo 'was neither a British victory nor a Prussian victory; it was an Allied victory, ' says Pedlow (p. 282). For Waterloo enthusiasts, this essay alone justifies buying the book." Noted Clausewitz scholar Jon Sumida (U.Md) writes that "On Waterloo is essential reading for those seeking an understanding of Clausewitz's distinctive approach to historical case study as the basis of practical knowledge of armed conflict. Clausewitz's history of the campaign of 1815 incorporates methods of critical analysis explained in Book II of On War, which were addressed primarily to the observation and assessment of past cases of strategic and operational decision-making by commanders-in chief. The Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow edition provides a highly readable translation of a work previously accessible only in German that illustrates Clausewitz's approach to the replication and evaluation of the experience of high command." The Editors: Christopher Bassford is Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, DC. Daniel Moran is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, CA. Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium.

A military historian assesses the leadership style of the man who defeated Napoleon. The Duke of Wellington’s victory at the Battle of Waterloo cemented his reputation as a great general, and much subsequent writing on his career has taken an uncritical, sometimes chauvinistic view of his talents. Little has been published that fully pins down the reality of Wellington’s leadership, clearly identifying his weaknesses as well as his strengths. George E. Jaycock, in this perceptive and thought-provoking reassessment, does not aim to undermine Wellington’s achievements, but to provide a more nuanced perspective. He clarifies some simple but fundamental truths regarding his leadership and his performance as a commander. Through an in-depth study of his actions over the war years of 1808 to 1815, the author reassesses Wellington’s effectiveness as a commander, the competence of his subordinates, and the qualities of the troops he led. His study gives a fascinating insight into Wellington’s career and abilities. Wellington’s Command is absorbing reading for both military historians and those with an interest in the Napoleonic period.