What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices.

This book discusses the philosophical foundations of bioethics, with a particular focus on the tensions and potential dilemmas generated by the intuitionist meta-ethical commitments of the predominant normative theory, namely “the four principles approach.” This view is based on the prima facie norms of respect for autonomy (one ought to respect the autonomous choices of subjects of scientific research/patients), non-maleficence (one ought to refrain from inflicting harm), beneficence (one ought to do good and prevent, or remove, harm) and justice (one ought to treat people fairly). The tensions in applying these basic principles may lead to inaction in scientific experiments involving human subjects or to arbitrary applications of the norms in the art of caring. The problem can be made explicit in these terms: on the one hand, caring without respecting seems blind, degenerating into forms of paternalism when, for instance, the carer imposes her conception of the good life or a particular procedure on the cared-for; on the other hand, respecting without caring amounts to indifference or individualism when, for example, a person does not look after a vulnerable being properly. The initial hypothesis of this book, then, is that the concept of respectful care can be built up, working from an ethico-philosophical perspective, to be a leading notion capable of guiding our daily actions and bioethical practices.

Though women’s employment patterns in Europe have been changing drastically over several decades, the repercussions of this social revolution are just beginning to garner serious attention. Many scholars have presumed that diversity and change in women’s employment is based on the structures of welfare states and women’s responses to economic incentives and disincentives to join the workforce; How Welfare States Care provides in-depth analysis of women’s employment and childcare patterns, taxation, social security, and maternity leave provisions in order to show this logic does not hold. Combining economic, sociological, and psychological insights, Kremer demonstrates that care is embedded in welfare states and that European women are motivated by culturally and morally-shaped ideals of care that are embedded in welfare states—and less by economic reality.

This book discusses whether we desire things because they are good, or whether they are good because we desire them.

The author assesses the ethics of care as a promising alternative to the familiar moral theories that serve so inadequately to guide our lives. Held examines what we mean by care and focuses on caring relationships. She also looks at the potential of care for dealing with social issues and global problems.

Slote provides care ethics with its first full-scale account of moral education, and shows that the often-voiced suspicion that care ethics supports the status quo and is counterproductive to feminist goals is actually the very opposite of the truth.

Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood examine the welfare system - its recipients, its providers and the many policy ideas surrounding it. Focusing on the AFDC Programme (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), they identify three models that have been used to explain welfare dependency and test them against an accumulating body of evidence, offering suggestions for identifying potential long-term recipients so that resources can be targeted to encourage self-sufficiency. Finally, they review policy options.