Following the invasion of Poland in September 1939 (which started the Second World War), a period of inaction called the Phony War ("Sitzkrieg" or "Dr�le de guerre") set in between the major powers. Adolf Hitler had hoped that France and Britain would acquiesce in his conquest and quickly make peace. On 6 October, he made a peace offer to both Western Powers. Even before they had time to respond, on 9 October, he also formulated a new military policy in case their reply was negative: F�hrer-Anweisung N�6, or "F�hrer-Directive Number 6".Hitler had always fostered dreams about major military campaigns to defeat the Western European nations as a preliminary step to the conquest of territory in Eastern Europe, thus avoiding a two-front war. However, these intentions were absent from F�hrer-Directive N�6. This plan was firmly based on the seemingly more realistic assumption that Germany's military strength would still have to be built up for several more years and that for the moment only limited objectives could be envisaged. They were aimed at improving Germany's ability to survive a long, protracted war in the West. Hitler ordered a conquest of the Low Countries to be executed at the shortest possible notice. This would stop France from occupying them first, and prevent Allied air power from threatening the vital German Ruhr Area. It would also provide the basis for a successful long-term air and sea campaign against Britain. There was no mention in the F�hrer-Directive of any immediate consecutive attack to conquer the whole of France, although as much as possible of the border areas in northern France should be occupied.While writing the directive, Hitler had also assumed that such an attack could be initiated within a period of at most a few weeks, but the very day he issued it he was disabused of this illusion. It transpired that he had been misinformed about the true state of Germany's forces. The motorized units had to recover, repairing the damage to their vehicles incurred in the Polish campaign, and ammunition stocks were largely depletedOn 10 October 1939, the British refused Hitler's offer of peace; on 12 October, the French did the same. Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the German Army (Generalstabschef des Heeres), presented the first plan for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow") on 19 October, the pre-war codename of plans for campaigns in the Low Countries: the Aufmarschanweisung N�1, Fall Gelb ("Deployment Instruction No. 1, Case Yellow"). Halder's plan has often been compared to the Schlieffen Plan, which the Germans attempted to execute in 1914 during the opening phase of the First World War. It was similar in that both plans entailed an advance through the middle of Belgium, but while the intention of the Schlieffen Plan was to gain a decisive victory by executing a surprise encirclement of the French Army, Aufmarschanweisung N�1 was based on an unimaginative frontal attack, sacrificing a projected half a million German soldiers to attain the limited goal of throwing the Allies back to the River Somme. Germany's strength for 1940 would then be spent; only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin.

AFTER six months of war the riddle is still the same: Can the Allies defeat Nazi Germany by their blockade, or can she become self-supporting in safety behind the Siegfried Line? Strategists and statisticians are busy checking and rechecking the facts and estimating the potentialities. Nobody can prove what the final issue will be. But one can ascertain the range of probabilities. At first sight it seems as though history were repeating itself in a cycle of only twenty-five years. Again Great Britain and France are fighting Germany on the Western Front; again they are trying to throttle her by a naval blockade; again Mitteleuropa is in the German grasp. But at closer range the contours look different. In 1914 the war came as a surprise after an era of forty-four years of peace. A large accumulation of invisible reserves was ready for mobilization by both sides when the struggle began. This time, though Nazi Germany has built up and is operating a highly perfected totalitarian fortress economy, she lacks the dormant reserves normally carried over from a long era of peace. Further, Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium and northern France are not, this time, in her hands. Even the Saar coal and iron region lies almost idle, within range of the Maginot Line guns. Offsetting these disadvantages, the whole German machinery of planning, rationing and requisitioning became fully operative from the first day of war. This happened last time only after the war had been going on for two years. Our conclusion must be that although Germany is weaker today in economic assets than she was in 1914, she is relatively stronger in utilizing them. Her substance is smaller, but her effective exploitation of it is greater.

Soldiers to the Last Day: Rhineland- Westphalian 6th Infantry Division, 1935-1945 recounts the history of the German 6th Infantry Division from its formation in 1935 to its destruction at Babruysk in July 1944; then its resurrection and continued fighting until the end of the war. Among the first divisions established by the Wehrmacht, the 6th Infantry Division had one of the longest and bloodiest records of continuous combat of any division-Allied or Axis. Engaging in combat within weeks of the outbreak of WWII, the division fought to the last hour of the war. Based primarily on German sources, in particular the rare divisional and regimental histories and war diaries, and on personal accounts and letters of its soldiers, Soldiers to the Last Day presents the German view of the war from inside divisional headquarters and down to the individual Landser as the division marches across France in 1940, advances to the Volga during Operation Barbarossa, fights the brutal battles of Rzhev, Kursk, Babruysk; and makes last desperate attempts to defend the homeland in 1945. It is a tale of courage, determination, suffering, and in the end-betrayal.

Since the end of World War II, Germans have struggled with the legacy of the Wehrmacht—the unified armed forces mobilized by Adolf Hitler in 1935 to ensure the domination of the Third Reich in perpetuity. Historians have vigorously debated whether the Wehrmacht's atrocities represented a break with the past or a continuation of Germany's military traditions. Now available for the first time in English, this meticulously researched yet accessible overview by eminent historian Rolf-Dieter Müller provides the most comprehensive analysis of the organization to date, illuminating its role in a complex, horrific era. Müller examines the Wehrmacht's leadership principles, organization, equipment, and training, as well as the front-line experiences of soldiers, airmen, Waffen SS, foreign legionnaires, and volunteers. He skillfully demonstrates how state-directed propaganda and terror influenced the extent to which the militarized Volksgemeinschaft (national community) was transformed under the pressure of total mobilization. Finally, he evaluates the army's conduct of the war, from blitzkrieg to the final surrender and charges of war crimes. Brief acts of resistance, such as an officers' "rebellion of conscience" in July 1944, embody the repressed, principled humanity of Germany's soldiers, but ultimately, Müller concludes, the Wehrmacht became the "steel guarantor" of the criminal Nazi regime.

“A fantastic read . . . Whether your interest is armour or history I would highly recommend this book” (Military Modelling). The tank destroyer was a bold—though some would say flawed—answer to the challenge posed by the seemingly unstoppable German Blitzkrieg. The TD was conceived to be light and fast enough to outmaneuver panzer forces and go where tanks could not. At the same time, the TD would wield the firepower needed to kill any German tank on the battlefield. Indeed, American doctrine stipulated that TDs would fight tanks, while American tanks would concentrate on achieving and exploiting breakthroughs of enemy lines. The Tank Killers follows the men who fought in the TDs, from the formation of the force in 1941 through the victory over the Third Reich in 1945. It is a story of American flexibility and pragmatism in military affairs. Tank destroyers were among the very first units to land in North Africa in 1942. Their first vehicles were ad hoc affairs: halftracks and weapons carriers with guns no better than those on tanks, thin armor affording the crews considerably less protection. Almost immediately, the crews began adapting to circumstances, along with their partners in the infantry and armored divisions. By the time North Africa was in Allied hands, the TD had become a valued tank fighter, assault gun, and artillery piece. The reconnaissance teams in TD battalions, meanwhile, had established a record for daring operations that would continue for the rest of the war. The story continues with the invasion of Italy and, finally, that of Fortress Europe on June 6, 1944. By now, the brass had decreed that half the force would convert to towed guns, a decision that dogged the affected crews through the end of the war. The TD men encountered increasingly lethal enemies, ever more dangerous panzers that were often vulnerable only to their guns, while American tank crews watched in frustration as their rounds bounced harmlessly off the thick German armor. They fought under incredibly diverse conditions that demanded constant modification of tactics, and their equipment became ever more deadly. By VE-Day, the tank destroyer battalions had achieved impressive records, generally with kill-loss rates heavily in their favor. Yet the army after the war concluded that the concept of a separate TD arm was so fundamentally flawed that not a single battalion existed after November 1946. The Tank Killers draws heavily on the records of the tank destroyer battalions and the units with which they fought, as well as personal stories from veterans of the force.

Narrative histories highlighting organization, combat experiences, and casualties of each division Lists of constituent units and division commanders Sources for further reading on each division This is the first of 3 definitive volumes that cover the German ground forces that swept across Europe with such ruthless efficiency in 1939 and 1940 and battled the Allies around the globe until the bitter end in 1945. Taken together, these volumes are the most comprehensive and accessible reference available on the Germany Army in World War II, unmatched in the information compiled on each division from inception to destruction. Volume One covers the 1st through 290th Infantry Divisions.

Focusing on the German land forces, with chapters on the history of the German Army, pre-war development, command structures, infantry, armoured formations, artillery and support services. The book offers interesting facts and figures of every sort, from infantry tactical doctrine through the make-up of a Type 1944 infantry division to the number of operational panzers Rommel had at his disposal during the El Alamein campaign and the types of artillery employed in the Atlantic Wall fortifications before the D-Day landings. It also includes colour artworks of key equipment and weapons, reference tables, diagrams, maps and charts, presenting all the core data in easy-to-follow formats.