In-depth case studies of twelve terrorist groups and individuals who, from 1946 to 1998, allegedly acquired or employed CBW agents. Policymakers, scholars, and the news media have been alarmed by the potential for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) terrorism, and the U.S. Congress has allocated billions of dollars for counterterrorism and "consequence management" programs. Driving these concerns are the global spread of scientific knowledge and technology relevant to CBW terrorism and the vulnerability of civilian populations to chemical and biological attacks. Notably lacking from the analysis, however, has been a careful assessment of the terrorists themselves. What types of terrorist groups or individuals are both capable of acquiring chemical and biological weapons and motivated to use them, and for what purposes? Further, what types of toxic agents would probably be produced, and how would they be delivered? Answers to these questions would enable policymakers to prepare for the most likely contingencies. To this end, Toxic Terror provides in-depth case studies of twelve terrorist groups and individuals who, from 1946 to 1998, allegedly acquired or employed CBW agents. The cases were researched from primary sources, including court documents, interviews, and declassified government files. By comparing the twelve cases, the book identifies characteristic motivations and patterns of behavior associated with CBW terrorism and provides an empirical basis for prudent, cost-effective strategies of prevention and response.

Technē’s Paradox—a frequent theme in science fiction—is the commonplace belief that technology has both the potential to annihilate humanity and to preserve it. Advocating Weapons, War, and Terrorism looks at how this paradox applies to some of the most dangerous of technologies: population bombs, dynamite bombs, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and improvised explosive devices. Hill’s study analyzes the rhetoric used to promote such weapons in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By examining Thomas R. Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, the courtroom address of accused Haymarket bomber August Spies, the army textbook Chemical Warfare by Major General Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. West, the life and letters of Manhattan Project physicist Leo Szilard, and the writings of Ted “Unabomber” Kaczynski, Hill shows how contemporary societies are equipped with abundant rhetorical means to describe and debate the extreme capacities of weapons to both destroy and protect. The book takes a middle-way approach between language and materialism that combines traditional rhetorical criticism of texts with analyses of the persuasive force of weapons themselves, as objects, irrespective of human intervention. Advocating Weapons, War, and Terrorism is the first study of its kind, revealing how the combination of weapons and rhetoric facilitated the magnitude of killing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and illuminating how humanity understands and acts upon its propensity for violence. This book will be invaluable for scholars of rhetoric, scholars of science and technology, and the study of warfare.

The first book to offer a rigorous, sophisticated analysis of ISIS's rhetoric and why it is so persuasive ISIS wages war not only on the battlefield but also online and in the media. Through a close examination of the words and images ISIS uses, with particular attention to the "digital caliphate" on the web, Philippe-Joseph Salazar theorizes an aesthetic of ISIS and its self-presentation. As a philosopher and historian of ideas, well versed in both the Western and the Islamic traditions, Salazar posits an interpretation of Islam that places speech--the profession of faith--at the center of devotion and argues that evocation of the simple yet profound utterance of faith is what gives power to the rhetoric that ISIS and others employ. At the same time, Salazar contends that Western discourse has undergone a "rhetorical disarmament." To win the fight against ISIS and Islamic extremism, Western democracies, their media, politicians, and counterterrorism agencies must consider radically changing their approach to Islamic extremism.

In WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM, 2/e, Dr. James Forest and Brigadier General (Retired) Russell Howard have collected original and previously published seminal articles and essays by scientists, academics, government officials, and members of the nation’s security and intelligence communities. The editors and several of the authors write from practical field experience in nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. Others have had significant responsibility for developing government policies to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The contributors include many significant names in the field including Bruce Hoffman, Ashton Carter, William Perry, Brian Jenkins, Jonathan Tucker, Charles Ferguson, David Albright, Gary Ackerman, and Gregory Koblentz. Unit I of the book introduces key terms and addresses important strategic and policy debates. Authors explain how the new forms of terrorism affect the post-9/11 security environment and how weapons of mass destruction could give terrorists short-term, asymmetric attack advantages over conventional military forces. Unit II offers detailed accounts of the characteristics, availability, and dangers of specific types of WMD, along with five case studies that associate theory with practice—an important feature of this volume. Unit III is focused on key dimensions of the WMD threat to critical infrastructure. Unit IV deals with past, present, and future national and international responses to—and defenses against—the threat of WMD terrorism. And in the final section of the volume, authors provide several analytical frameworks for predicting future WMD threats, and draw from historical events to identify lessons and strategies for the future. Appendices include U.S. national strategy documents on countering terrorism and standards for controlling WMD materials and technologies.

There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis. No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.

The Oklahoma City bombing, intentional crashing of airliners on September 11, 2001, and anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001 have made Americans acutely aware of the impacts of terrorism. These events and continued threats of terrorism have raised questions about the impact on the psychological health of the nation and how well the public health infrastructure is able to meet the psychological needs that will likely result. Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism highlights some of the critical issues in responding to the psychological needs that result from terrorism and provides possible options for intervention. The committee offers an example for a public health strategy that may serve as a base from which plans to prevent and respond to the psychological consequences of a variety of terrorism events can be formulated. The report includes recommendations for the training and education of service providers, ensuring appropriate guidelines for the protection of service providers, and developing public health surveillance for preevent, event, and postevent factors related to psychological consequences.

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are designed to cause destruction on a vastly greater scale than any conventional weapons, with the potential to kill thousands in a single attack and with effects that may persist in the environment and in our bodies indefinitely. This report by the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr Hans Blix, sets out 60 recommendations on how the world community, national governments and civil society should address this global challenge under the following headings: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; preventing nuclear terrorism; reducing the threat and numbers of existing nuclear weapons; moving from regulating nuclear weapons to outlawing them; biological and toxin weapons; chemical weapons; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery means, missile defences and weapons in space; export controls, international assistance and non-governmental actors; compliance, verification, enforcement and the role of the United Nations.