The pilot-less drones, smart bombs and other high-tech weapons on display in recent conflicts are all the outcome of weapons research. However, the kind of scientific and technological endeavour has been around for a long time, producing not only the armaments of Nazi Germany and the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, but the catapults used in ancient Greece and Rome and the assault rifles used by child soldiers in Africa. In this book John Forge examines such weapons research and asks whether it is morally acceptable to undertake such an activity. He argues that it is in fact morally wrong to take part in weapons research as its primary purpose is to produce the means to harm others, and moreover he argues that all attempts to then justify participation in weapons research do not stand up to scrutiny. This book has wide appeal in fields of philosophy and related areas, as well to a more general audience who are puzzled about the rate at which new weapons are accumulated.

The mission of Army Research Laboratory (ARL) is to discover, innovate, and transition science and technology to ensure dominant strategic land power. The ARL's core competencies include network and information sciences, computational sciences, human sciences, materials and manufacturing sciences, propulsion sciences, ballistic sciences, and protection sciences. As part of a biennial assessment of the scientific and technical quality of the ARL, this interim report summarizes the findings and recommendations for network and information sciences, computational sciences, and human sciences research.

Materials science and engineering (MSE) contributes to our everyday lives by making possible technologies ranging from the automobiles we drive to the lasers our physicians use. Materials Science and Engineering for the 1990s charts the impact of MSE on the private and public sectors and identifies the research that must be conducted to help America remain competitive in the world arena. The authors discuss what current and future resources would be needed to conduct this research, as well as the role that industry, the federal government, and universities should play in this endeavor.

In this study, CISAC tackles the technical dimensions of a longstanding controversy: To what extent could existing and plausibly attainable measures for transparency and monitoring make possible the verification of all nuclear weaponsâ€"strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployedâ€"plus the nuclear-explosive components and materials that are their essential ingredients? The committee's assessment of the technical and organizational possibilities suggests a more optimistic conclusion than most of those concerned with these issues might have expected.

In order to achieve the revolutionary new defense capabilities offered by materials science and engineering, innovative management to reduce the risks associated with translating research results will be needed along with the R&D. While payoff is expected to be high from the promising areas of materials research, many of the benefits are likely to be evolutionary. Nevertheless, failure to invest in more speculative areas of research could lead to undesired technological surprises. Basic research in physics, chemistry, biology, and materials science will provide the seeds for potentially revolutionary technologies later in the 21st century.