Waterloo is one of the most famous battles in history and it has given rise to a vast and varied literature. The strategy and tactics of the battle and the entire Waterloo campaign have been analysed at length. The commanders, manoeuvres and critical episodes, and the intense experiences of the men who took part, have all been recorded in minute detail. But the organization, structure and fighting strength of the armies that fought in the battle have received less attention, and this is the subject of Philip Haythornthwaite's detailed, authoritative and engaging study. Through a close description of the structure and personnel of each of the armies he builds up a fascinating picture of their makeup, their methods and their capabilities. The insight he offers into the contrasting styles and national characteristics of the forces that came together on the Waterloo battlefield gives a fresh perspective on the extraordinary clash of arms that ended the Napoleonic era

Recent research into the Duke of Wellington's armies during the Peninsular War and the Waterloo campaign has enhanced our understanding of the men he led, and this new biographical guide to his brigade commanders is a valuable contribution to this growing field. Ron McGuigan and Robert Burnham have investigated the lives and careers of a group of men who performed a vital role in Wellington's chain of command. These officers were the brigadiers and major generals who, for a variety of reasons, never made the jump to become permanent division commanders. Their characters, experience and level of competence were key factors in the successes and failures of the army as a whole. Their biographies give us a fascinating insight into their individual backgrounds, their strengths and weaknesses, and the makeup of the society they came from. Each biography features a table covering essential information on the individual, his birth and death dates, the dates of his promotions and details of his major commands. This is followed by a concise account of his life and service.

A dual biography of the greatest opposing generals of their age who ultimately became fixated on one another, by a bestselling historian. 'Thoroughly enjoyable, beautifully written and meticulously researched' Observer On the morning of the battle of Waterloo, the Emperor Napoleon declared that the Duke of Wellington was a bad general, the British were bad soldiers and that France could not fail to win an easy victory. Forever afterwards historians have accused him of gross overconfidence, and massively underestimating the calibre of the British commander opposed to him. Andrew Roberts presents an original, highly revisionist view of the relationship between the two greatest captains of their age. Napoleon, who was born in the same year as Wellington - 1769 - fought Wellington by proxy years earlier in the Peninsula War, praising his ruthlessness in private while publicly deriding him as a mere 'sepoy general'. In contrast, Wellington publicly lauded Napoleon, saying that his presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men, but privately wrote long memoranda lambasting Napoleon's campaigning techniques. Although Wellington saved Napoleon from execution after Waterloo, Napoleon left money in his will to the man who had tried to assassinate Wellington. Wellington in turn amassed a series of Napoleonic trophies of his great victory, even sleeping with two of the Emperor's mistresses.

What better way to 'read' the momentous Battle of Waterloo than to follow the movements of the main military commanders on that fateful day (18 June 1815). For the British side of the action, we dog the footsteps, and learn about the decisions and actions of The Duke of Wellington. For the French perspective we follow both Napoleon Bonaparte and his right-hand man Marshal Ney, who in fact played the more critical role.

Explores the relationship between the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte and the Duke of Wellington prior to and in the aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo, the most decisive battle of the nineteenth century.

“For anyone seeking a full understanding of the end of the Napoleonic era this book is a must read . . . [a] tour de force of research.” —Clash of Steel On the morning of 3 July 1815, the French General Rémi Joseph Isidore Exelmans, at the head of a brigade of dragoons, fired the last shots in the defense of Paris until the Franco-Prussian War sixty-five years later. Why did he do so? Traditional stories of 1815 end with Waterloo, that fateful day of 18 June, when Napoleon Bonaparte fought and lost his last battle, abdicating his throne on 22 June. But Waterloo was not the end; it was the beginning of a new and untold story. Seldom studied in French histories and virtually ignored by English writers, the French Army fought on after Waterloo. Many commanders sought to reverse that defeat—at Versailles, Sevres, Rocquencourt, and La Souffel, the last great battle and the last French victory of the Napoleonic Wars. Marshal Grouchy, much maligned, fought his army back to Paris by 29 June, with the Prussians hard on his heels. On 1 July, Vandamme, Exelmans and Marshal Davout began the defense of Paris. Davout took to the field in the north-eastern suburbs of Paris along with regiments of the Imperial Guard and battalions of National Guards. For the first time ever, using the wealth of material held in the French Army archives in Paris, along with eyewitness testimonies from those who were there, Paul Dawson brings alive the bitter and desperate fighting in defense of the French capital. The 100 Days Campaign did not end at Waterloo, it ended under the walls of Paris fifteen days later.