Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the DoD¿s need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. There have been funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DoD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. This report determined: (1) the extent to which DoD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes; and (2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DoD's urgent needs processes. This review conducted 23 case studies. Illustrations.

An assessment of the ground combat uniforms and camouflage utility uniforms currently in use in the DoD. Although the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps state that they have estab. require. for combat clothing that include performance capabilities, the report found that performance standards are not related to specific combat environ. The report found technical production standards guide the manufacturing of uniforms for all four services. Service and Special Ops Command officials indicate that the ground combat uniforms and their protective gear and body armor are interoperable. However, service officials stated that they do not have a requirement to regularly test their uniform and other services' protective gear for interoperability. Charts and tables.

For decades, the DoD has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and recognizes them as part of the total force. In Iraq and Afghanistan contractor personnel now outnumber deployed troops. In Iraq more than 95,000 DoD contractors support 92,000 troops, and in Afghanistan more than 112,000 DoD contractors support approx. 94,000 troops. DoD anticipates that the number of contractors will grow in Afghanistan as the dept. increases its troop presence in that country. Several long-standing challenges have hindered DoD¿s ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. This testimony addresses the extent to which DoD has institutionalized operational contract support. Illustrations.

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, DoD established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tech'y., and counterimprovised explosive devices systems. This review determined: (1) what DoD entities exist for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DoD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) has DoD evaluated the potential for consolidations. Illus. This is a print on demand report.

" From 2007 to 2012, the Army received about $42 billion to fund its expenses for the reset of equipment-including more than $21 billion for depot maintenance-in support of continuing overseas contingency operations in Southwest Asia. Reset is intended to mitigate the effects of combat stress on equipment by repairing, rebuilding, upgrading, or procuring replacement equipment. Reset equipment is used to supply non-deployed units and units preparing for deployment while meeting ongoing operational requirements. In 2007, GAO reported that the Army's reset strategy did not target equipment shortages for units deploying to theater. For this report, GAO (1) examined steps the Army has taken to improve its equipment reset strategy since 2007, and (2) determined the extent to which the Army's reset reports to Congress provide visibility over reset costs and execution. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and Army documentation on equipment reset strategies and monthly Army reports to Congress, and interviewed DOD and Army officials. "

Contractors provide a broad range of support to U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, with the number of contractors at times exceeding the number of military personnel in each country. The DoD has acknowledged shortcomings in how the role of contractors was addressed in its planning for Iraq and Afghanistan. This report assesses DoD's development of contract support plans. It examines: (1) what progress DoD has made in developing operational contract support annexes for its operation plans; (2) the extent to which contract requirements are included in other sections of operation plans; and (3) DoD's progress in establishing a long-term capability to include operational contract support requirements in operation plans. Charts and tables.