Combining original research with the latest scholarship Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792 - 1914 examines war and its aftermath from Napoleonic times to the outbreak of the First World War. Throughout, this fine book treats warfare as a social and political phenomenon no less than a military and technologial one, and includes discussions on: * The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars * Napoleon III and the militarization of Europe * Bismark, Molkte, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71 * new technologies and weapons * seapower, imperialism and naval warfare * the origins and outbreak of the First World War. For anyone studying, or with in interest in European warfare, this book details the evolution of land and naval warfare and highlights the swirling interplay of society, politics and military decision making.

Combining original research with the latest scholarship Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792 - 1914 examines war and its aftermath from Napoleonic times to the outbreak of the First World War. Throughout, this fine book treats warfare as a social and political phenomenon no less than a military and technologial one, and includes discussions on: * The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars * Napoleon III and the militarization of Europe * Bismark, Molkte, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71 * new technologies and weapons * seapower, imperialism and naval warfare * the origins and outbreak of the First World War. For anyone studying, or with in interest in European warfare, this book details the evolution of land and naval warfare and highlights the swirling interplay of society, politics and military decision making.

This book is a comparative study of military operations conducted my modern states between the French Revolution and World War I. It examines the complex relationship between political purpose and strategy on the one hand, and the challenge of realizing strategic goals through military operations on the other. It argues further that following the experience of the Napoleonic Wars military strength was awarded a primary status in determining the comparative modernity of all the Great Powers; that military goals came progressively to distort a sober understanding of the national interest; that a genuinely political and diplomatic understanding of national strategy was lost; and that these developments collectively rendered the military and political catastrophe of 1914 not inevitable yet probable.

The first twenty years of post-Cold War US defense and diplomatic policies toward Asia have looked a good deal like the previous 50, namely: continued deterrence based upon overwhelming, offensive military predominance. In East Asia, all powers harbor common and divergent interests based on fragmented nationalist identities and complex economic interdependence. In this multipolar Asian system, new Chinese military capabilities could support both the wish to secure its own interests as well as a more expansive vision for regional leadership, which might harbor a destabilizing geopolitical agenda. How the United States addresses this reality via military procurements and employment concepts for the Asian theater could either detract from or enhance crisis stability. The US defense establishment must reorient its force posture to save money, manage conflicts of interest, and prevent future interstate crises. This analysis provides a framework for how the United States should ideally structure and use military power so as to best support the diplomatic resolution of conflicting interests without resorting to full-scale warfare. It also critiques the usual Western military focus on offensive strategic predominance in force postures, itself often fuelled by the unrealistic pursuit of the opponent’s complete submission via victory in decisive battles.

"This collection of essays provides a broad strategic interpretation of European warfare from 1792-1815. Unlike traditional military histories which focus on a revolution in military affairs from the French view, this volume offers a general European perspective, placing the armies and the wars in historical context, while addressing substantive changes to respective military systems."--Provided by publisher.

Wawro describes the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1, that violently changed the course of European history.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1 violently changed the course of European History. Alarmed by Bismarck's territorial ambitions and the Prussian army's crushing defeats of Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866, French Emperor Napoleon III vowed to bring Prussia to heel. Digging into many European and American archives for the first time, Geoffrey Wawro's The Franco-Prussian War describes the war that followed in thrilling detail. While the armies mobilized in July 1870, the conflict appeared 'too close to call'. Prussia and its German allies overwhelmingly outnumbered the French. But Marshal Achille Bazaine's grognards ('old grumblers') were the stuff of legend, the most resourceful, battle-hardened, sharp-shooting troops in Europe. From the political intrigues that began and ended the war to the bloody battles at Gravelotte and Sedan and the last murderous fights on the Loire and in Paris, this is a stunning, authoritative history of the Franco-Prussian War.