One of the most surprising developments in Mexico's transition to democracy is the outbreak of criminal wars and large-scale criminal violence. Why did Mexican drug cartels go to war as the country transitioned away from one-party rule? And why have criminal wars proliferated as democracy has consolidated and elections have become more competitive subnationally? In Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley develop a political theory of criminal violence in weak democracies that elucidates how democratic politics and the fragmentation of power fundamentally shape cartels' incentives for war and peace. Drawing on in-depth case studies and statistical analysis spanning more than two decades and multiple levels of government, Trejo and Ley show that electoral competition and partisan conflict were key drivers of the outbreak of Mexico's crime wars, the intensification of violence, and the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society.

When widespread state-criminal collusion persists in transitions from autocracy to democracy, electoral competition becomes a catalyst of large-scale criminal violence.

"In the most widely-accepted minimalist definition, democracy is conceived as a governance system in which citizens select their representatives through competitive elections and resolve their differences without bloodshed. While in recent decades scholars have shown that countries transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy tend to experience major outbreaks of political violence, and that peace prevails only after democratic rules and practices have been fully engrained in society, the association of democratic mechanisms with different forms of violence continues to be mind-boggling. It continues to be analytically surprising and morally disheartening when newly established democratic mechanisms like voting and competitive elections become catalysts of collective violence. It is even more disconcerting when democratic mechanisms become triggers of violent conflict among "non-political" actors like organized criminal groups and drug cartels, which have long been considered quintessential examples of private illicit actors with no interest or meaningful connection with electoral politics. This book is the result of a long intellectual shared journey aimed at making sense of an uncommonly intense wave of large-scale criminal violence in Mexico that began six years after the end of one-party rule, when President Felipe Calderâon (2006-2012) declared war on the country's drug cartels, triggering multiple state-cartel and inter-cartel violent conflicts across Mexican territory"--

Papers from a conference held at Mount Kisco, N.Y., Feb. 1982, sponsored by the Committee on States and Social Structures, the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies, and the Joint Committee on Western European Studies of the Social Science Research Council. Includes bibliographies and index.

This book examines the behaviour of political parties in situations where they experience conflict between two or more important objectives.

State crackdowns on drug cartels often backfire, producing entrenched 'cartel-state conflict'; deterrence approaches have curbed violence but proven fragile. This book explains why.

New ethnographic data leads to insights into the widespread yet understudied phenomenon of criminal extortion in Latin America.