The essays focus on the work of Vladimir Jank l vitch as a moral philosopher, particularly that aspect of his work dealing with the question of forgiveness. They treat topics such as the place of moral philosophy in relation to his work as a whole, his relationship to contemporary French thought, and the backgrounds of classical Judaic tradition and world literature. The centerpiece of this tableau is Jank l vitch's book Le Pardon (Forgiveness). Chief among the distinguishing characteristics is its rigorous defense of what might be termed a forgiveness free of the entanglements that taint the common understanding of forgiveness--what Jank l vitch refers to as pseudo-forgiveness. The advocacy of forgiveness in the name of political or social expediency, as well as the psychological benefit for the victim, are similarly repudiated. In their place, Jank l vitch substitutes a radical forgiveness that is "initial, sudden, spontaneous"--not able to erase the past, but able to create a new future and, thereby, a new relationship to the past. He does not permit even this future, however, to serve as forgiveness's justification. For him, beyond all justifications, beyond justice itself, forgiveness is a gift akin to love.

The essays focus on the work of Vladimir Jankélévitch as a moral philosopher, particularly that aspect of his work dealing with the question of forgiveness. They treat topics such as the place of moral philosophy in relation to his work as a whole, his relationship to contemporary French thought, and the backgrounds of classical Judaic tradition and world literature. The centerpiece of this tableau is Jankélévitch’s book Le Pardon (Forgiveness). Chief among the distinguishing characteristics is its rigorous defense of what might be termed a forgiveness free of the entanglements that taint the common understanding of forgiveness—what Jankélévitch refers to as pseudo-forgiveness. The advocacy of forgiveness in the name of political or social expediency, as well as the psychological benefit for the victim, are similarly repudiated. In their place, Jankélévitch substitutes a radical forgiveness that is “initial, sudden, spontaneous”—not able to erase the past, but able to create a new future and, thereby, a new relationship to the past. He does not permit even this future, however, to serve as forgiveness’s justification. For him, beyond all justifications, beyond justice itself, forgiveness is a gift akin to love.

Philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch has only recently begun to receive his due from the English-speaking world, thanks in part to discussions of his thought by Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Paul Ricoeur. His international readers have long valued his unique, interdisciplinary approach to philosophy’s greatest questions and his highly readable writing style. Originally published in 1967, Le Pardon, or Forgiveness, is one of Jankélévitch’s most influential works. In it, he characterizes the ultimate ethical act of forgiving as behaving toward the perpetrator as if he or she had never committed the action, rather than merely forgetting or rationalizing it—a controversial notion when considering events as heinous as the Holocaust. Like so many of Jankélévitch’s works, Forgiveness transcends standard treatments of moral problems, not simply generating a treatise on one subject but incorporating discussions of topics such as free will, giving, creativity, and temporality. Translator Andrew Kelley masterfully captures Jankélévitch’s melodic prose and, in a substantive introduction, reviews his life and intellectual contributions. Forgiveness is an essential part of that legacy, and this indispensable English translation provides key tools for understanding one of the great Western philosophers of the twentieth century.

One can love and not forgive or out of love decide not to forgive. Or one can forgive but not love, or choose to forgive but not love the ones forgiven. Love and forgiveness follow parallel and largely independent paths, a truth we fail to acknowledge when we pressure others to both love and forgive. Individuals in conflict, sparring social and ethnic groups, warring religious communities, and insecure nations often do not need to pursue love and forgiveness to achieve peace of mind and heart. They need to remain attentive to the needs of others, an alertness that prompts either love or forgiveness to respond. By reorienting our perception of these enduring phenomena, the contributors to this volume inspire new applications for love and forgiveness in an increasingly globalized and no longer quite secular world. With contributions by the renowned French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, the poet Haleh Liza Gafori, and scholars of religion (Leora Batnitzky, Nils F. Schott, Hent de Vries), psychoanalysis (Albert Mason, Orna Ophir), Islamic and political philosophy (Sari Nusseibeh), and the Bible and literature (Regina Schwartz), this anthology reconstructs the historical and conceptual lineage of love and forgiveness and their fraught relationship over time. By examining how we have used—and misused—these concepts, the authors advance a better understanding of their ability to unite different individuals and emerging groups around a shared engagement for freedom and equality, peace and solidarity.

One of the most distinctive figures in twentieth-century French philosophy, Vladimir Jankélévitch (1903-1985), is becoming increasingly known to the English-speaking world. The Bad Conscience, which focuses on remorse, is central to his moral philosophy. Indeed, Jankélévitch finds the foundation of ethics in our experience of "the bad conscience” or remorse. Unlike repentance, remorse arises out of the realization that we can never undo what has been done in the past; it will remain and be a part of us forever. This bad conscience gives rise to scruples in us and, in doing so, makes us aware of our freedom and the responsibility that our freedom entails. According to Jankélévitch, most ethical theories and systems shield us from remorse. This is unfortunate because, in his view, the very experience of remorse provides the seeds to overcome it. In the end, the overcoming of remorse--as the result of a gratuitous act--is accompanied by true joy. In many ways The Bad Conscience and Jankélévitch’s Forgiveness (Chicago 2005) represent philosophical "bookends.” For Jankélévitch, remorse is a condition or state that gives rise to forgiveness and without which forgiveness would make no sense. Remorse opens up the possibility of forgiveness, but it does not necessitate it. From a Jankélévitchean perspective, forgiveness is the gratuitous response of one person to another’s remorse. La mauvaise conscience was first published in France in 1933, but was subsequently revised and expanded. This carefully and sensitively translated English-language edition corresponds to the most recent edition, but indicates where differences among the editions occur. Andrew Kelley, who is also responsible for the English Edition of Jankélévitch’s Forgiveness (Chicago 2005), provides a superb Translator’s Introduction placing The Bad Conscience into intellectual and historical context.

After Injury explores the practices of forgiveness, resentment, and apology in three key moments when they were undergoing a dramatic change. The three moments are early Christian history (for forgiveness), the shift from British eighteenth-century to Continental nineteenth-century philosophers (for resentment), and the moment in the 1950s postwar world in which British ordinary language philosophers and American sociologists of everyday life theorized what it means to express or perform an apology. The debates that arose in those key moments have largely defined our contemporary study of these practices.

This book is concerned with the aporias, or impasses, of forgiveness, especially in relation to the legacy of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis and their collaborators during World War II. Banki argues that, while forgiveness of the Holocaust is and will remain impossible, we cannot rest upon that impossibility. Rather, the impossibility of forgiveness must be thought in another way. In an epoch of “worldwidization,” we may not be able simply to escape the violence of scenes and rhetoric that repeatedly portray apology, reconciliation, and forgiveness as accomplishable acts. Accompanied by Jacques Derrida’s thought of forgiveness of the unforgivable, and its elaboration in relation to crimes against humanity, the book undertakes close readings of literary, philosophical, and cinematic texts by Simon Wiesenthal, Jean Améry, Vladimir Jankélévitch, Robert Antelme and Eva Mozes Kor. These texts contend with the idea that the crimes of the Nazis are inexpiable, that they lie beyond any possible atonement or repair. Banki argues that the juridical concept of crimes against humanity calls for a thought of forgiveness—one that would not imply closure of the infinite wounds of the past. How could such a forgiveness be thought or dreamed? Banki shows that if today we cannot simply escape the “worldwidization” of forgiveness, then it is necessary to rethink what forgiveness is, the conditions under which it supposedly takes place, and especially its relation to justice.