This book is the first authoritative text on virtue jurisprudence - the belief that the final end of law is not to maximize preference satisfaction or protect certain rights and privileges, but to promote human flourishing. Scholars of law, philosophy and politics illustrate here the value of the virtue ethics tradition to modern legal theory.

The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen a renaissance in the study of virtue -- a topic that has prevailed in philosophical work since the time of Aristotle. Several major developments have conspired to mark this new age. Foremost among them, some argue, is the birth of virtue ethics, an approach to ethics that focuses on virtue in place of consequentialism (the view that normative properties depend only on consequences) or deontology (the study of what we have a moral duty to do). The emergence of new virtue theories also marks this new wave of work on virtue. Put simply, these are theories about what virtue is, and they include Kantian and utilitarian virtue theories. Concurrently, virtue ethics is being applied to other fields where it hasn't been used before, including bioethics and education. In addition to these developments, the study of virtue in epistemological theories has become increasingly widespread to the point that it has spawned a subfield known as 'virtue epistemology.' This volume therefore provides a representative overview of philosophical work on virtue. It is divided into seven parts: conceptualizations of virtue, historical and religious accounts, contemporary virtue ethics and theories of virtue, central concepts and issues, critical examinations, applied virtue ethics, and virtue epistemology. Forty-two chapters by distinguished scholars offer insights and directions for further research. In addition to philosophy, authors also deal with virtues in non-western philosophical traditions, religion, and psychological perspectives on virtue.

This book gathers together leading voices in virtue theory—an increasingly influential aspect of legal theory in the 21st century—to take stock of virtue jurisprudence’s evolution and suggest ways in which this approach can be further developed. The contributions address the three main axes along which virtue jurisprudence has unfolded in the past decades: the quest to provide a suitable virtue-based foundation for the law (in general) or for some aspects of it (in particular, but not exclusively, criminal law); the investigation of the role played by character traits in legal decision-making; and the investigation of how the law can be part of a virtuous life. As will become apparent for readers of this volume, those lines are converging and, as they do so, a general virtue-based approach to the study of law is starting to emerge. Crucial in addressing problems with legal experience for which the resources of traditional legal theory are insufficient, this book’s investigation of virtue theory and virtue jurisprudence will be of interest to all of those studying legal decision-making and the philosophy of law, as well as those studying virtue ethics more widely. It was originally published as a special issue of Jurisprudence.

Equality is the endangered species of political ideals. Even left-of-center politicians reject equality as an ideal: government must combat poverty, they say, but need not strive that its citizens be equal in any dimension. In his new book Ronald Dworkin insists, to the contrary, that equality is the indispensable virtue of democratic sovereignty. A legitimate government must treat all its citizens as equals, that is, with equal respect and concern, and, since the economic distribution that any society achieves is mainly the consequence of its system of law and policy, that requirement imposes serious egalitarian constraints on that distribution. What distribution of a nation's wealth is demanded by equal concern for all? Dworkin draws upon two fundamental humanist principles--first, it is of equal objective importance that all human lives flourish, and second, each person is responsible for defining and achieving the flourishing of his or her own life--to ground his well-known thesis that true equality means equality in the value of the resources that each person commands, not in the success he or she achieves. Equality, freedom, and individual responsibility are therefore not in conflict, but flow from and into one another as facets of the same humanist conception of life and politics. Since no abstract political theory can be understood except in the context of actual and complex political issues, Dworkin develops his thesis by applying it to heated contemporary controversies about the distribution of health care, unemployment benefits, campaign finance reform, affirmative action, assisted suicide, and genetic engineering.

After 25 centuries, Aristotle's influence on our society's moral thinking remains profound even when subterranean. Typical members of our society can often be made to see that their moral thought and action are, in crucial ways, unwittingly Aristotelian. No one in contemporary philosophical ethics can afford to ignore Aristotle. Much of the finest work in recent moral philosophy has been overtly and professedly Aristotelian in inspiration. And many writers who would officiallydistance themselves from Aristotle and his contemporary followers are nonetheless indebted to him, sometimes in ways that they do not realise.Values and Virtues provides a platform for some notable writers in the area to present and discuss their new ideas about Aristotelian ethics in a way that will advance the academic debate and engage the interest of a broad range of philosophical readers.

This text looks at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean.

The book presents a new focus on the legal philosophical texts of Aristotle, which offers a much richer frame for the understanding of practical thought, legal reasoning and political experience. It allows understanding how human beings interact in a complex world, and how extensive the complexity is which results from humans’ own power of self-construction and autonomy. The Aristotelian approach recognizes the limits of rationality and the inevitable and constitutive contingency in Law. All this offers a helpful instrument to understand the changes globalisation imposes to legal experience today. The contributions in this collection do not merely pay attention to private virtues, but focus primarily on public virtues. They deal with the fact that law is dependent on political power and that a person can never be sure about the facts of a case or about the right way to act. They explore the assumption that a detailed knowledge of Aristotle's epistemology is necessary, because of the direct connection between Enlightened reasoning and legal positivism. They pay attention to the concept of proportionality, which can be seen as a precondition to discuss liberalism.