According to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, general elections were to be held in July 1956 that would lead to the reunification of North and South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement, however, was doomed from the start, as the South Vietnamese leaders did not suscribe to it and the leaders of the Communist North saw its value as primarily a propaganda tool. By 1956 it was obvious to all that reunification in accordance with the agreement was impossible, and the North Vietnamese looked to China for advice and assistance. Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources--many only recently made available--this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists' goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced. The book shows that the Hanoi government was remarkably in control of its own decision-making.

The historiography of the Cold War has long been dominated by American motivations and concerns, with Southeast Asian perspectives largely confined to the Indochina wars and Indonesia under Sukarno. Southeast Asia’s Cold War corrects this situation by examining the international politics of the region from within rather than without. It provides an up-to-date, coherent narrative of the Cold War as it played out in Southeast Asia against a backdrop of superpower rivalry. When viewed through a Southeast Asian lens, the Cold War can be traced back to the interwar years and antagonisms between indigenous communists and their opponents, the colonial governments and their later successors. Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Philippines join Vietnam and Indonesia as key regional players with their own agendas, as evidenced by the formation of SEATO and the Bandung conference. The threat of global Communism orchestrated from Moscow, which had such a powerful hold in the West, passed largely unnoticed in Southeast Asia, where ideology took a back seat to regime preservation. China and its evolving attitude toward the region proved far more compelling: the emergence of the communist government there in 1949 helped further the development of communist networks in the Southeast Asian region. Except in Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s role was peripheral: managing relationships with the United States and China was what preoccupied Southeast Asia’s leaders. The impact of the Sino-Soviet split is visible in the decade-long Cambodian conflict and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. This succinct volume not only demonstrates the complexity of the region, but for the first time provides a narrative that places decolonization and nation-building alongside the usual geopolitical conflicts. It focuses on local actors and marshals a wide range of literature in support of its argument. Most importantly, it tells us how and why the Cold War in Southeast Asia evolved the way it did and offers a deeper understanding of the Southeast Asia we know today.

This new edition masterfully explains the origins and outcome of America's war in Vietnam by focusing on its local dimensions.

This book covers the chronological development and operational experience of the Chinese Army's intervention in the Vietnam War against the U.S. in 1968-1973. Based on communist sources and interviews, it examines China's intentions, decision-making, war preparation, training, battle plan and execution, tactical problem solving, political indoctrination, and combat assessment.

This book is designed to present a fully developed theory of international crisis and conflict, along with substantial evidence of these two closely related phenomena. The book begins with a discussion of these topics at a theoretical level, defining and elaborating on core concepts: international crisis, interstate conflict, severity, and impact. This is followed by a discussion of the international system, along with two significant illustrations, the Berlin Blockade crisis (1948) and the India-Pakistan crisis over Kashmir (1965-66). The book then presents a unified model of crisis, focusing on the four phases of an international crisis, which incorporate the four periods of foreign policy crises for individual states. Findings from thirteen conflicts representing six regional clusters are then analyzed, concluding with a set of hypotheses and evidence on conflict onset, persistence, and resolution.

Why do leaders sometimes challenge, rather than accept, the international structures that surround their states? In The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, Andrew Kennedy answers this question through in-depth studies of Chinese foreign policy under Mao Zedong and Indian foreign policy under Jawaharlal Nehru. Drawing on international relations theory and psychological research, Kennedy offers a new theoretical explanation for bold leadership in foreign policy, one that stresses the beliefs that leaders develop about the 'national efficacy' of their states. He shows how this approach illuminates several of Mao and Nehru's most important military and diplomatic decisions, drawing on archival evidence and primary source materials from China, India, the United States and the United Kingdom. A rare blend of theoretical innovation and historical scholarship, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru is a fascinating portrait of how foreign policy decisions are made.

This book focuses on the neglected cultural front of the Cold War in Asia to explore the mindsets of Asian actors and untangle the complex cultural alliances that undergirded the security blocs on this continent.