Air assault operations in Southeast Asia would not have been possible without certain key decisions a decade earlier. This book traces the most important milestones which led to the eventual formation of airmobile divisions.

This is the exciting story of the development of U.S. airmobile power from theory to practice, involving air transport, fixed wing aircraft, and attack helicopters culminating in Vietnam War operations. It includes analysis of airmobile combat operations; doctrinal and interservice disputes; equipment descriptions; and the organization of combat and support units. It also includes data about airmobility in South Vietnam's army and it features personal reflections of the author, who was at the center of airmobility development and who commanded large airmobile units. John J. Tolson in June 1939 participated in the first tactical air movement of ground forces by the U.S. Army. He was in all combat jumps of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment during World War II, became an Army aviator in 1957, and served as Director of Army Aviation and Commandant of the Army Aviation School. From April 1967 to July 1968 he commanded the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Vietnam. (Includes many maps and photographs)

[Includes 2 charts, 12 maps, and 41 illustrations] Although troops had been dropped by parachute since the early years of the Second World War, the use of helicopters to move large number of troops only came to the fore in the years before the Vietnam War. During the Vietnam War they would prove their value in allowing the American troops tactical flexibility, surprise and most of all mobility that the dense terrain and difficult communications of Vietnam complicated. “The author of this monograph, Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, has been involved with the airmobile concept since June 1939, when he participated in the first tactical air movement of ground forces by the U.S. Army. Participating in all the combat jumps of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment during World War II, he became an Army aviator in 1957, and later served as Director of Army Aviation and Commandant of the U.S. Army Aviation School. From April 1967 to July 1968 he served as Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Vietnam.” As the author himself says in his preface; “Although Vietnam was the first large combat test of airmobility, air assault operations in Southeast Asia would not have been possible without certain key decisions a decade earlier. This study attempts to trace the most important milestones which led to the eventual Formation of airmobile divisions. “It would be impossible in a single volume to adequately describe every airmobile operation in Vietnam during the years 1961-1971. Therefore, only selected operations have been chosen as examples of different airmobile tactics. Many of these were selected because of the author’s personal knowledge. Another author might have selected different operations. “I believe I’d be remiss in this account if I were not candid with the reader on some of the pros and cons of airmobility. Thus, throughout the text, I have inserted comments that are intended to broaden the reader’s view of this issue.”

In this book the author – an Army veteran of Vietnam – explains the composition, capabilities, equipment and missions of the US Army and Marine Corps helicopter and airmobile units in the Vietnam war and exactly how they carried out their missions. It centers on the classic airmobile assault mission: how it was planned and prepared; how the troop-carrying “slicks” and their “gunship” escorts and support teams actually operated; and the opposition and hazards that they faced on the LZ. The text is illustrated with wartime photos, organization charts, and color plates showing both the machines and the tactics that where employed.

[Includes 1 chart, 17 maps, 6 diagrams and 38 illustrations] “The generally unsuccessful experience of French armored forces in Southeast Asia from the end of World War II to 1954 convinced American military men that armored units could not be employed in Vietnam. “It was not until 1967, however, when a study titled Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam...was sent to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, that the potential of armored forces was fully described to the Army’s top leaders. Despite the study’s findings that armored cavalry was probably the most cost-effective force on the Vietnam battlefield-there was little that could be done to alter significantly either the structure of forces already sent to Vietnam or those earmarked for deployment...The armored force of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, meanwhile had been successful enough in fighting the elusive Viet Cong that U.S. armored units had been deployed in limited numbers, usually as part of their parent divisions. “From early March 1965 until the cease-fire in Jan. 1973, U.S. armored units participated in virtually every large-scale offensive operation and worked closely with South Vietnamese Army and other free world forces. After eight years of fighting over land on which tanks were once thought to be incapable of moving, in weather that was supposed to prohibit armored operations, and dealing with an elusive enemy against whom armored units were thought to be at a considerable disadvantage, armored forces emerged as powerful, flexible, and essential battle forces. In large measure they contributed to the success of the free world forces, not only in close combat, but in pacification and security operations as well. When redeployment began in early 1969, armored units were not included in the first forces scheduled for redeployment, and indeed planners moved armored units down the scale time and again, holding off their redeployment until the very end.”