In this book the author – an Army veteran of Vietnam – explains the composition, capabilities, equipment and missions of the US Army and Marine Corps helicopter and airmobile units in the Vietnam war and exactly how they carried out their missions. It centers on the classic airmobile assault mission: how it was planned and prepared; how the troop-carrying “slicks” and their “gunship” escorts and support teams actually operated; and the opposition and hazards that they faced on the LZ. The text is illustrated with wartime photos, organization charts, and color plates showing both the machines and the tactics that where employed.

This book reveals the evolving US, Viet Cong and NVA tactics at battalion level and below throughout the Vietnam War. Beginning with a description of the terrain, climate and the unique nature of operations in this theatre of war, the author, a Vietnam veteran himself, goes on to explain how unit organisation was broken down by combatant forces and the impact this had on the kind of tactics they employed. In particular, the author highlights how units were organised in reality on the battlefield as opposed to their theoretical tables of organisation. US tactics included the standard US tactical doctrine as prescribed by several field manuals and in which leaders and troops were rigourously trained. But it also reveals how many American units developed innovative small unit tactics specifically tailored to the terrain and enemy practices. In contrast, this book also reveals the tactics employed by Viet Cong and NVA units including their own Offensive Operations, Reconnaissance, Movement Formations and Security, and Ambushes.

Osprey's study of airmobile tactics used in the Vietnam War (1955-1975). • With its first major use in battle during the Vietnam War, the helicopter ushered in a radically different way of fighting, despite its proven vulnerability to ground fire. Either delivering troops into hostile territory and removing them after the fighting ended, or armed with guns, grenade launchers, and rockets to provide rapid and wide-ranging air to ground support fire, the helicopter - available for the first time in sufficient numbers and capable of a wide range of missions - played a central role in the war. • From the beginning, with obsolete Korean War helicopters carrying ARVN troops into battle, to Huey gunships evacuating the wounded at la Drang in 1965, and transport helicopters evacuating Americans from Saigon rooftops in 1975; this was the first real helicopter war. By the middle of the war, the helicopter, in particular the Huey model had become as important to the army as the tank, the armored personnel carrier, and the jeep. • Presenting a concise history of the first ever major use of helicopters in battle, Gordon L. Rottman, a former Green Beret in Vietnam, describes in detail the development of the critical airmobile tactics that ultimately changed the way America fights its battles.

Vietnam was the US Special Forces most complex and controversial mission, one that began in 1957 and ended in 1973. Camp strike forces, mobile strike forces, mobile guerrilla forces, special reconnaissance projects, training missions and headquarters duty provided vastly differing experiences and circumstances for SF soldiers. Other fluctuating factors were the terrain, the weather and the shifting course of the war itself. Gordon Rottman examines the training, life, weapons and combat experiences of the Special Forces soldier in this challenging environment.

Dr. Donald J. Mrozeks research sheds considerable light on how the use of air power evolved in the Vietnam War. Much more than simply retelling events, Mrozek analyzes how history, politics, technology, and the complexity of the war drove the application of air power in a long and divisive struggle. Mrozek delves into a wealth of original documentation, and his scholarship is impeccable. His analysis is thorough and balanced. His conclusions are well reasoned but will trouble those who have never seriously considered how the application of air power is influenced by factors far beyond the battlefield. Wether or not the reader agrees with Mrozek, the quality of his research and analysis makes his conclusions impossible to ignore. John C. Fryer, Jr. Brigadier General, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education