The essays in this volume, written by leading historians and a former British foreign secretary, survey the strategy, politics and personalities of British peacemaking in 1919. Many of the intractable problems faced by negotiators are studied in this volume. Neglected issues, including nascent British commercial interests in Central Europe and attitudes towards Russia are covered, along with important reassessments of the viability of the Versailles treaty, reparations, appeasement, and the long-term effects of the settlement. This collection is a compelling and resonant addition to revisionist studies of the 'Peace to End Peace' and essential reading for those interested in international history.

The ethical republic -- Common counsel -- A certain blindness -- Trials of neutrality -- Trojan horsemanship -- Provincials no longer -- The will to believe -- The fable of the Fourteen points -- A living thing is born -- Conclusion: power without victory and the right to believe

“Nixon raises all the timely questions about the present state of the world, and then answers them both systematically and thoroughly.” —The New York Times In this acclaimed national bestseller, Richard Nixon offers a comprehensive strategy for the West—a vital plan of action that will help ensure peace, prosperity, and freedom in the next century. From glasnost and summitry to arms control and “Star Wars,” from Nicaragua and China to Europe and Japan, he gives seasoned, no-nonsense advice on all tough foreign policy issues. The former President draws on a lifetime of experience in international affairs to examine the crucial challenges facing the United States and the West and how best to go forward in the 21st century.

Victory Without Peace concentrates on the U.S. Navy in European and Near Eastern waters during the post-World War I era. As participants in the Versailles peace negotiations, the Navy was charged with executing the naval terms of the Armistice as well as preserving stability and peace. U.S. warships were deploying into the Near East, Baltic, Adriatic, and Northern Europe, while simultaneously withdrawing its demobilized forces from European waters. This signifies the first time the U.S. Navy contributed to peacetime efforts, setting a precedent continues today. Conversely, Congressional appropriations handicapped this deployment by demobilization, general naval policy and postwar personnel, and operating funds reductions. Though reluctant to allocate postwar assets into seemingly unimportant European and Near Eastern waters, the Navy was pressured by the State Department and the American Relief Administration's leader, Herbert Hoover, to deploy necessary forces. Most of these were withdrawn by 1924 and the European Station assumed the traditional policy of showing the flag.