This is the first modern study of the veto. In addition to tracing the genesis and historical evolution from Ancient Rome, through the ultimate inclusion in the Constitution, it also explores the veto's consequences for modern presidents. In doing so, Spitzer promotes a key argument about the relation between the veto power and the Presidency — namely, that the rise of the veto power, beginning with the first Chief Executive, is symptomatic of the rise of the strong modern Presidency, and has in fact been a major tool of Presidency-building. A special and revealing irony of the veto power is seen in the finding that, despite its monarchical roots and anti-majoritarian nature, the veto has become a key vehicle for presidents to appeal directly to, and on behalf of, the people. Thus, the veto's utility for presidents arises not only as a power to use against Congress, but also as a symbolic, plebiscitary tool.

The book outlines legal limits to the veto power of UN Security Council permanent members while atrocity crimes are occurring.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is intended to provide an effective framework for responding to crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It is a response to the many conscious-shocking cases where atrocities - on the worst scale - have occurred even during the post 1945 period when the United Nations was built to save us all from the scourge of genocide. The R2P concept accords to sovereign states and international institutions a responsibility to assist peoples who are at risk - or experiencing - the worst atrocities. R2P maintains that collective action should be taken by members of the United Nations to prevent or halt such gross violations of basic human rights. This Handbook, containing contributions from leading theorists, and practitioners (including former foreign ministers and special advisors), examines the progress that has been made in the last 10 years; it also looks forward to likely developments in the next decade.

This book argues that the structure of the policy-making process in Nigeria explains variations in government performance better than other commonly cited factors.