Large banks and dealers use and reuse collateral pledged by nonbanks, which helps lubricate the global financial system. The supply of collateral arises from specific investment strategies in the asset management complex, with the primary providers being hedge funds, pension funds, insurers, official sector accounts, money markets and others. Post-Lehman, there has been a significant decline in the source collateral for the large dealers that specialize in intermediating pledgeable collateral. Since collateral can be reused, the overall effect (i.e., reduced ?source' of collateral times the velocity of collateral) may have been a $4-5 trillion reduction in collateral. This decline in financial lubrication likely has impact on the conduct of global monetary policy. And recent regulations aimed at financial stability, focusing on building equity and reducing leverage at large banks/dealers, may also reduce financial lubrication in the nonbank/bank nexus.

Financial lubrication in markets is indifferent to margin posting via money or collateral; the relative price(s) of money and collateral matter. Some central banks are now a major player in the collateral markets. Analogous to a coiled spring, the larger the quantitative easing (QE) efforts, the longer the central banks will impact the collateral market and associated repo rate. This may have monetary policy and financial stability implications since the repo rates map the financial landscape that straddles the bank/nonbank nexus.

In global financial centers, short-term market rates are effectively determined in the pledged collateral market, where banks and other financial institutions exchange collateral (such as bonds and equities) for money. Furthermore, the use of long-dated securities as collateral for short tenors—or example, in securities-lending and repo markets, and prime brokerage funding—impacts the risk premia (or moneyness) along the yield curve. In this paper, we deploy a methodology to show that transactions using long dated collateral also affect short-term market rates. Our results suggest that the unwind of central bank balance sheets will likely strengthen the monetary policy transmission, as dealer balance-sheet space is now relatively less constrained, with a rebound in collateral reuse.

The present way of thinking about financial intermediation does not fully incorporate the rise of asset managers as a major source of funding for banks through the shadow banking system. Asset managers are dominant sources of demand for non-M2 types of money and serve as source collateral ?mines' for the shadow banking system. Banks receive funding through the re-use of pledged collateral ?mined' from asset managers. Accounting for this, the size of the shadow banking system in the U.S. may be up to $25 trillion at year-end 2007 and $18 trillion at year-end 2010, higher than earlier estimates. In terms of policy, regulators will need to consider the re-use of pledged collateral when defining bank leverage ratios. Also, given asset managers' demand for non-M2 types of money, monitoring the shadow banking system will warrant closer attention well beyond the regulatory perimeter.

In global financial centers, short-term market rates are effectively determined in the pledged collateral market, where banks and other financial institutions exchange collateral (such as bonds and equities) for money. Furthermore, the use of long-dated securities as collateral for short tenors—or example, in securities-lending and repo markets, and prime brokerage funding—impacts the risk premia (or moneyness) along the yield curve. In this paper, we deploy a methodology to show that transactions using long dated collateral also affect short-term market rates. Our results suggest that the unwind of central bank balance sheets will likely strengthen the monetary policy transmission, as dealer balance-sheet space is now relatively less constrained, with a rebound in collateral reuse.

Traditional measures of leverage in the financial system tend to reflect bank balance sheet data. The paper argues that these traditional, bank-centric measures should be augmented by considering pledged collateral in the financial system since pledged collateral provides a measure of an important part of nonbank funding to banks. From a policy perspective, the paper suggests that a broader view on leverage will enhance our understanding of global systemic risk, and complement the theoretical work in this field by providing a link from micro-level leverage data to macro aggregates such as credit to the economy.

Transactions on wholesale capital markets are often secured by marketable collateral. However, collateral needs balance sheet space to move within the financial system. Certain new regulations that constrain private sector bank balance sheets may have the effect of impeding collateral flows. This may have important consequences for monetary policy transmission, for short term money market functioning, and for market liquidity. In this context (and in contrast to the literature, which has focused mainly on the repo market), this paper analyzes securities-lending, derivatives, and prime-brokerage markets as suppliers of collateral. It highlights the incentives created by new regulations for different suppliers of collateral. Moreover, it argues the that central banks should be mindful of the effect of their actions on the ability of markets to intermediate collateral.