Varieties of Realism argues that it is not possible to represent the layout of objects and surfaces in space outside the dictates of formal visual geometry, the geometry of natural perspective. The book examines most of the world's coherent representational art styles, both in terms of the geometry of their creation and in terms of their perceptual effects on the viewer. A lucid exposition of modern geometrical principles and relations, accessible to the nonmathematical reader, is followed by an analysis of all known styles as variants of natural perspective, as true varieties of realism. Delineating the physical and mechanical constraints that determine the act of visual representation in painting and drawing, the author traces the intimate relations among seemingly distant styles and considers the kind of perceptual information about the world each can carry. Margaret Hagen is a perceptual psychologist with an ecological point of view. Her rigorous but readable presentation of visual theory and research offers provocative new insights into the connections among vision, geometry, and art.

A Collection of Essays for college courses such as: Magical Realism in Latin America. Spanish-American Fiction: XXth Century; Special Topics: Jorge Luis Borges and Sex and Magic in Latin American Literature. The term "magic realism" or "magical realism" has been bruited about with great frequency in the last half of the twentieth century, especially in reference to contemporary Latin American literature, yet it is not always clear exactly what is meant by this designation. In his introduction to this outstanding collection of essays, Dr. Clark Zlotchew attempts to elucidate the meaning and scope of the term by providing a historical overview of it, defining the literary modes often confused with it and offering some current opinions on what a definition of "magic realism" should or might be. The ten essays that follow present an analysis of works by writers such as Jorge Luis Borges, Carlos Fuentes, Julio Ricci, Antonio Brailovsky and Enrique Jaramillo Levi, in an attempt to illustrate the manner in which some Latin American authors create their own brand of "magic realism".

"An original exploration of the work of writer Richard Ford in the context of its place within contemporary debates about the possible role, meaning of, and value of literary realism in a postmodern age"--

Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from serious defects. In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated and resilient than its predecessors. This position—‘cognitive instrumentalism’—involves three core theses. First, science makes theoretical progress primarily when it furnishes us with more predictive power or understanding concerning observable things. Second, scientific discourse concerning unobservable things should only be taken literally in so far as it involves observable properties or analogies with observable things. Third, scientific claims about unobservable things are probably neither approximately true nor liable to change in such a way as to increase in truthlikeness. There are examples from science throughout the book, and Rowbottom demonstrates at length how cognitive instrumentalism fits with the development of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century chemistry and physics, and especially atomic theory. Drawing upon this history, Rowbottom also argues that there is a kind of understanding, empirical understanding, which we can achieve without having true, or even approximately true, representations of unobservable things. In closing the book, he sets forth his view on how the distinction between the observable and unobservable may be drawn, and compares cognitive instrumentalism with key contemporary alternatives such as structural realism, constructive empiricism, and semirealism. Overall, this book offers a strong defence of instrumentalism that will be of interest to scholars and students working on the debate about realism in philosophy of science.

Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such “moral saints” as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Schindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures.

This book advances a coherent statement of defensive realism as a theory of strategy for our time and adds to our understanding of defensive realism as a grand theory of IR in particular and our understanding of IR in general and contributes to the ongoing debates among major paradigms of international relations.

Until quite recently, almost no philosophers trained in the continental tradition saw anything of value in realism. The situation in analytic philosophy was always different, but in continental philosophy realism was usually treated as a pseudo-problem. That is no longer the case. In this provocative new book, two leading philosophers examine the remarkable rise of realism in the continental tradition. While exploring the similarities and differences in their own positions, they also consider the work of others and assess rival trends in contemporary philosophy. They begin by discussing the relation between realism and materialism, which DeLanda links closely but which Harman tries to separate. Part Two covers the many different meanings of realism, with the two authors working together to develop an expanded definition of the term. Part Three features a spirited exchange on the respective virtues and drawbacks of DeLanda's realism of attractors and singularities and Harman's object-oriented theory. Part Four shifts to the question of the knowability of the real, as the authors discuss whether scientific knowledge does full justice to reality. In Part Five, they shift the focus to space, time, and science more generally, and here Harman offers a defence of actor-network theory despite its obvious anti-realist elements. Lively, accessible and engaging, this book is the best attempt so far to clarify the different paths for realism in continental philosophy. It will be of great value to students and scholars of continental philosophy and to anyone interested in the cutting-edge debates in philosophy and critical theory today.