The annual Conferences on Value Inquiry bring together philosophers, scientists and humanists to discuss the many facets of the problem of value in the experience of the individual and in contemporary society. One of the criteria in choosing papers for the Conference is the ability to stimulate discussion and clarification. The papers in the present volumes show deep concern with the problems and responsibilities in making choices of value.

The annual Conferences on Value Inquiry bring together philosophers, scientists and humanists to discuss the many facets of the problem of value in the experience of the individual and in contemporary society. One of the criteria in choosing papers for the Conference is the ability to stimulate discussion and clarification. The papers in the present volumes show deep concern with the problems and responsibilities in making choices of value.

The annual Conferences on Value Inquiry bring together philosophers, scientists and humanists to discuss the many facets of the problem of value in the experience of the individual and in contemporary society. One of the criteria in choosing papers for the Conference is the ability to stimulate discussion and clarification. The papers in the present volumes show deep concern with the problems and responsibilities in making choices of value.

Professor Duverger at last provides the student with an overall view of the methodology of the social sciences. He briefly traces the origin of the notion of a social science, showing how it emerged from social philosophy. Its essential elements and pre-conditions are described; the splintering of social science into specialist disciplines is explained, and the need for a general sociology confirmed. The techniques of observation used by social scientists are dealt with in some detail and the unity of the social sciences is illustrated by examples of the universal application of these techniques. Documentary evidence in its various forms are described along with the basic analytical techniques, including quantitative methods and content analysis. Other methods of gathering information through polls, interviews, attitude scales and participant observation are all described. Professor Duverger brings together the different kinds of analysis used to assess the information thus gathered. Arguing that observing and theorizing are not two different stages or levels of research, he examines the practical value and difficulties of general sociological theories, partial theories and models and working hypotheses. He both describes and assesses the limitations of experiment and the scope of comparative methods in the social sciences. He then gives elementary instructions for using and assessing the value of mathematical techniques. The possibilities of presenting social phenomena through graphs and charts are also explored. There are useful book lists and diagrams.

The concepts of rationality that are used by social scientists in the formation of hypotheses, models and explanations are explored in this collection of original papers by a number of distinguished philosophers and social scientists. The aim of the book is to display the variety of the concepts used, to show the different roles they play in theories of very different kinds over a wide range of disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, political science and anthropology, and to assess the explanatory and predictive power that a theory can draw from such concepts.

The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be "value-free." In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence.Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.

This book examines the question of how our knowledge of social life affects, and ought to affect, our way of living it. In so doing, it critically discusses two epistemological models of social science – the positivist and the interpretive – from the viewpoint of the political theories which, it is argued, are implicit in these models; moreover, it proposes a third model – the critical – which is organised around an explicit account of the relation between social theory and practical life. The book has the special merit of being a good overview of the principal current ideas about the relation between social theory and political practice, as well as an attempt at providing a new and more satisfactory account of this relationship. To accomplish this task, it synthesises work from the analytic philosophy of social science with that of the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt school.