Powell, Thomas Reed. Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. xv, 229 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-210-7. Cloth. $70. * With a Foreword by Paul A. Freund. Published versions of the James S. Carpentier lectures delivered by Powell [1880-1955] at Columbia University in 1955. Its chapters include "Establishment of Judicial Review," "Professions and Practices in Judicial Review," "National Power," "Federalism: Intergovernmental Relations," "Federalism: State Powers Affecting the National Economy; State Police Power" and "Federalism: State Powers Affecting the National Economy; State Taxing Power."

Through fresh readings of texts ranging from Homer's Iliad, Swift's Tale of a Tub, and Austen's Emma through the United States Constitution and McCulloch v. Maryland, James Boyd White examines the relationship between an individual mind and its language and culture as well as the "textual community" established between writer and audience. These striking textual analyses develop a rhetoric—a "way of reading" that can be brought to any text but that, in broader terms, becomes a way of learning that can shape the reader's life. "In this ambitious and demanding work of literary criticism, James Boyd White seeks to communicate 'a sense of reading in a new and different way.' . . . [White's] marriage of lawyerly acumen and classically trained literary sensibility—equally evident in his earlier work, The Legal Imagination—gives the best parts of When Words Lose Their Meaning a gravity and moral earnestness rare in the pages of contemporary literary criticism."—Roger Kimball, American Scholar "James Boyd White makes a state-of-the-art attempt to enrich legal theory with the insights of modern literary theory. Of its kind, it is a singular and standout achievement. . . . [White's] selections span the whole range of legal, literary, and political offerings, and his writing evidences a sustained and intimate experience with these texts. Writing with natural elegance, White manages to be insightful and inciteful. Throughout, his timely book is energized by an urgent love of literature and law and their liberating potential. His passion and sincerity are palpable."—Allan C. Hutchinson, Yale Law Journal "Undeniably a unique and significant work. . . . When Words Lose Their Meaning is a rewarding book by a distinguished legal scholar. It is a showcase for the most interesting sort of inter-disciplinary work: the kind that brings together from traditionally separate fields not so much information as ideas and approaches."—R. B. Kershner, Jr., Georgia Review

This book argues that the Constitution has a dual nature. The first aspect, on which legal scholars have focused, is the degree to which the Constitution acts as a binding set of rules that can be neutrally interpreted and externally enforced by the courts against government actors. This is the process of constitutional interpretation. But according to Keith Whittington, the Constitution also permeates politics itself, to guide and constrain political actors in the very process of making public policy. In so doing, it is also dependent on political actors, both to formulate authoritative constitutional requirements and to enforce those fundamental settlements in the future. Whittington characterizes this process, by which constitutional meaning is shaped within politics at the same time that politics is shaped by the Constitution, as one of construction as opposed to interpretation. Whittington goes on to argue that ambiguities in the constitutional text and changes in the political situation push political actors to construct their own constitutional understanding. The construction of constitutional meaning is a necessary part of the political process and a regular part of our nation's history, how a democracy lives with a written constitution. The Constitution both binds and empowers government officials. Whittington develops his argument through intensive analysis of four important cases: the impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson, the nullification crisis, and reforms of presidential-congressional relations during the Nixon presidency.

What are the different market types that shape the European Union's internal market? Schütze proposes three models that assist in explaining the transitions in the structure of the EU internal market. The international model demands that each state limits its external sovereignty, while retaining internal sovereignty over its national market. The federal model declares that within a "common market" states must lose a part of their internal sovereignty, and in accordance with the principle of "home state" control, goods are entitled to be sold freely on a "foreign" market in compliance with home state law. The national model proposes that the trade restrictions above a legislative or judicial Union standard should be removed. Schütze's book analyses the changing structure of European law in relation to the European internal market. The General Part starts out by offering a historical analysis of the relationship between international law and market coordination up to the twentieth century but also provides an in-depth analysis of the constitutional principles which controlled the "integration" of the US "common market". The Special Part then specifically addresses the decline of the international model in relation to the EU internal market and the corresponding rise of a federal market philosophy after Cassis de Dijon. The final chapter explores the exceptional constitutional principles that apply to fiscal matters. This is the second volume in Schütze's trilogy on the "Changing Structure of European Law". Exploring the changing structure of negative integration in the past 60 years, the book complements his previous volume "From Dual to Cooperative Federalism" which analysed the evolving structure of positive integration. A third volume will finally explore the formal constitutional aspects in the evolution of the European Union into a federal union of States.

What should a judge do when he must hand down a ruling based on a law that he considers unjust or oppressive? This question is examined through a series of problems concerning unjust law that arose with respect to slavery in nineteenth-century America. "Cover's book is splendid in many ways. His legal history and legal philosophy are both first class. . . . This is, for a change, an interdisciplinary work that is a credit to both disciplines."--Ronald Dworkin, Times Literary Supplement "Scholars should be grateful to Cover for his often brilliant illumination of tensions created in judges by changing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurisprudential attitudes and legal standards. . . An exciting adventure in interdisciplinary history."--Harold M. Hyman, American Historical Review "A most articulate, sophisticated, and learned defense of legal formalism. . . Deserves and needs to be widely read."--Don Roper, Journal of American History "An excellent illustration of the way in which a burning moral issue relates to the American judicial process. The book thus has both historical value and a very immediate importance."--Edwards A. Stettner, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science "A really fine book, an important contribution to law and to history."--Louis H. Pollak