Leading up to the Pacific War, Japanese naval strategists believed that a decisive fleet engagement would be fought against the United States Navy. Outnumbered by the USN, the Imperial Japanese Navy planned to use its large, ocean-going submarines to chip away at its opponent before the grand battle. In order to accomplish this, the IJN's submarine force was tasked to perform extended reconnaissance of the USN's battle fleet, even in port, and then shadow and attack it. For their part, the USN was fully aware of the potential threat posed by Japanese submarines, and destroyer crews were trained and equipped with modern anti-submarine weapons and tactics to screen the battle fleet. Challenging the assumption that Japanese submarines were ineffective during the Pacific War, this fully illustrated study examines their encounters with the US Navy, and the successes and failures of American destroyers in protecting their capital ships.

Leading up to the Pacific War, Japanese naval strategists believed that a decisive fleet engagement would be fought against the United States Navy. Outnumbered by the USN, the Imperial Japanese Navy planned to use its large, ocean-going submarines to chip away at its opponent before the grand battle. In order to accomplish this, the IJN's submarine force was tasked to perform extended reconnaissance of the USN's battle fleet, even in port, and then shadow and attack it. For their part, the USN was fully aware of the potential threat posed by Japanese submarines, and destroyer crews were trained and equipped with modern anti-submarine weapons and tactics to screen the battle fleet. Challenging the assumption that Japanese submarines were ineffective during the Pacific War, this fully illustrated study examines their encounters with the US Navy, and the successes and failures of American destroyers in protecting their capital ships.

This fully illustrated study examines and compares the roles of the US Navy submarines and the Imperial Japanese Navy's anti-submarine warfare capabilities during World War II. In 1941 and 1942, US Navy submarine operations in the Pacific were largely ineffective, hampered by faulty torpedo design, conservative tactics, and insufficiently aggressive submarine captains. Eventually, though, a new generation of wartime submarine commanders, combined with reliable torpedoes, new generation boats, improved intelligence, and advanced radar, inflicted devastating losses on Japanese shipping. Antisubmarine warfare was initially accorded a low priority by the Imperial Japanese Navy; the lack of ASW escorts and modern weaponry, and an inability to develop tactics, resulted in devastation to vital convoys, and hampered its ability to deter and destroy enemy submarines. This book explores all these factors, and the role that US submarines played in supporting the major fleet operations in the Pacific Theater, notching up almost 500 patrols by war's end for the loss of 52 submarines to the Japanese. The technical and tactical developments implemented by the opposing sides are documented in detail, including US improvements to submarine design and weaponry and more aggressive tactics, and the Japanese development of destroyer escorts, changes to depth charge design, and improved submarine detection capacity.

The different national tank doctrines of the United States and Imperial Japan resulted in a terrible mismatch of the predominant tank types in the crucial Central Pacific campaign. A flawed Japanese doctrine emphasized light infantry support tanks, often used in small numbers. Tactically, tanks were often frittered away in armored versions of the familiar banzai attacks. Meanwhile, the Americans saw the tank as an infantry support weapon, but developed a more systematic tactical doctrine. They settled upon a larger medium tank – in the case of most Marine Corps tank battalions, the diesel-powered M4A2 (unwanted by the US Army). This superbly detailed title reveals how both the two sides' tactical and technical differences in the approach to armored warfare soon became apparent over a series of deadly engagements, from the first tank fight at the battle of Tarawa in November 1943, through to engagements on Parry Island, Saipan, and Guam, before ending with Peleliu in September 1944.

This book covers the fierce night naval battles fought between the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during late 1943 as the Allies advanced slowly up the Solomons Islands toward the major Japanese naval base at Rabaul. During this period, several vicious actions were fought featuring the most modern destroyers of both navies. Throughout most of 1942, the Imperial Navy had held a marked edge and a key ingredient of these successes was their destroyer force, which combined superior training and tactics with the most capable torpedo in the world. Even into 1943 mixed Allied light cruiser/destroyer forces were roughly handled by Japanese destroyers. After these battles, the Americans decided to stop chasing Japanese destroyers with cruisers so the remainder of the battles in 1943 (with one exception) were classic destroyer duels. The Americans still enjoyed the technical edge provided to them by radar, and now added new, more aggressive tactics. The final result was the defeat of the Imperial Navy's finely trained destroyer force and the demonstration that the Japanese were unable to stop the Allies' advance.

Major Pacific actions from April through August 1942 include the Japanese attack on Ceylon, the Doolittle Raid on Japan, the battle of the Coral Sea, the battle of Midway Island, the U.S. landing on Guadalcanal, the battle of Savo Island, and the battle of the eastern Solomon Islands. Arctic actions include battle for convoy PQ.17. In Mediterranean, the Royal Navy interdicts Axis supply lines along Libyan and Egyptian coasts. In the Atlantic, the U.S. implements convoys along the East Coast.