"Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue States" is one essay in the "Essays in Public Policy" series of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. The essay was written by Thomas H. Henriksen and was published in February 1999. Henriksen asserts that the United States should use its powers to confront "rogue" governments that are dedicated to disrupting regional stability.

America and the Rogue States traces and examines the policies and interaction of the United States with the main adversarial nations in the post-Cold War era. The book concentrates on the three major rogue states-North Korea, Iran, and pre-invasion Iraq. What are termed as lesser rogue nations-Libya, Syria, Cuba, and the Sudan-receive summarized treatment in one chapter together with a brief discussion about why Afghanistan and Venezuela are not rogues. The author makes clear the distinctions among these confrontational regimes, noting that North Korea, Iran, and Saddam Hussein's Iraq aroused much more anxiety in Washington than lesser rogues and other troublesome states. After an opening chapter placing the rogue-nation phenomenon in historical and current context, the manuscript devotes one chapter each to the three major adversarial rogues. A final chapter deals with the less threatening rogue regimes. Each chapter follows a chronological format with description and analysis. The work is intended for a general reader interested in the topic; it also will have appeal as a supplemental text for university classes in international relations covering the period after the Cold War ended.

An analysis of the policies of preemption and regime change as well as an examination of US policy options for dealing with each country in the "axis of evil." In January 2002, President George W. Bush declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constituents of an "axis of evil." US strategy toward each of these countries has clearly varied since, yet similar issues and policy options have emerged for US relations with all three. Reshaping Rogue States seeks to improve our understanding of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as well as of current and future policy options to combat the threats these nations pose. The book's comprehensive analysis of preemption and regime change debates the circumstances under which each policy might be justified or legal under international law. Prominent strategists and policymakers consider alternatives to preemption—including prevention, counterproliferation, and cooperative security—and draw conclusions from efforts to bring about regime change in the past. Reshaping Rogue States also reviews the differing policy challenges presented by each so-called axis member. Specifically, it considers how the United States might strike a balance with North Korea through multilateral negotiations; the changes within Iran that call for changes in US policy; and the dilemmas the United States faces in post-Saddam Iraq, including continuing insurgency, instability, and the feasibility of democracy.

President Clinton and other U.S. officials have warned that "rogue states" pose a major threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era. But what exactly is a rogue state? Does the concept foster a sound approach to foreign policy, or is it, in the end, no more than a counterproductive political epithet? Robert Litwak traces the origins and development of rogue state policy and then assesses its efficacy through detailed case studies of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He shows that the policy is politically selective, inhibits the ability of U.S. policymakers to adapt to changed conditions, and has been rejected by the United States' major allies. Litwak concludes that by lumping and demonizing a disparate group of countries, the rogue state approach obscures understanding and distorts policymaking. In place of a generic and constricting strategy, he argues for the development of "differentiated" strategies of containment, tailored to the particular circumstances within individual states.

The bestselling author and activist “has delivered another impressive argument that the U.S. flouts international law when it finds it convenient to do so” (Publishers Weekly). In this still-timely classic, Noam Chomsky argues that the real “rogue” states are the United States and its allies. Chomsky turns his penetrating gaze toward US involvement in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America to trace the enduring combined effects of military domination and economic imperialism on these regions. “Noam Chomsky is like a medic attempting to cure a national epidemic of selective amnesia . . . [Rogue States is] a timely guide to the tactics that the powerful employ to keep power concentrated and people compliant . . . Chomsky’s work is crucial at a time when our empire perpetually disguises its pursuit of power under the banners of ‘aid,’ ‘humanitarian intervention,’ and ‘globalization.’ Americans have to begin deciphering the rhetoric. Chomsky’s a good place to start.” —The Village Voice “World-famous MIT linguist Chomsky has long kept up a second career as a cogent voice of the hard left, excoriating American imperialism, critiquing blinkered journalists and attacking global economic injustice.” —Publishers Weekly “Nothing escapes [Chomsky’s] attention . . . [Rogue States is] wonderfully lucid.” —PeaceWork Praise for Noam Chomsky “Chomsky is a global phenomenon . . . perhaps the most widely read voice on foreign policy on the planet.” —The New York Times Book Review “The conscience of the American people.” —New Statesman “One of the radical heroes of our age . . . a towering intellect . . . powerful, always provocative.” —The Guardian

Rogue State and its author came to sudden international attention when Osama Bin Laden quoted the book publicly in January 2006, propelling the book to the top of the bestseller charts in a matter of hours. This book is a revised and updated version of the edition Bin Laden referred to in his address.

William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, two of the world's foremost defense authorities, draw on their experience as leaders of the U.S. Defense Department to propose a new American security strategy for the twenty-first century. After a century in which aggression had to be defeated in two world wars and then deterred through a prolonged cold war, the authors argue for a strategy centered on prevention. Now that the cold war is over, it is necessary to rethink the risks to U.S. security. The A list--threats to U.S. survival--is empty today. The B list--the two major regional contingencies in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula that dominate Pentagon planning and budgeting--pose imminent threats to U.S. interests but not to survival. And the C list--such headline-grabbing places as Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti--includes important contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests. Thus the United States is enjoying a period of unprecedented peace and influence; but foreign policy and defense leaders cannot afford to be complacent. The authors' preventive defense strategy concentrates on the dangers that, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into true A-list threats to U.S. survival in the next century. These include Weimar Russia: failure to establish a self-respecting place for the new Russia in the post-cold war world, allowing it to descend into chaos, isolation, and aggression as Germany did after World War I; Loose Nukes: failure to reduce and secure the deadly legacy of the cold war--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union; A Rising China Turned Hostile: failure to shape China's rise to Asian superpower status so that it emerges as a partner rather than an adversary; Proliferation: spread of weapons of mass destruction; and Catastrophic Terrorism: increase in the scope and intensity of transnational terrorism.They also argue for