The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) provides services to some 28 million people. Despite the development of new technology, printed materials, in particular leaflets, play an important role in ensuring that customers are informed of services and entitlements. This NAO report examines how effectively the DWP manages the provision of accurate information in its leaflets issued to customers, as well as communicating clearly and effectively about benefits and services. It focuses on how the DWP manages the risks associated with producing and issuing inaccurate leaflets; whether it can ensure that the information in leaflets is accurate and accessible; and whether leaflets are easily available for customers. Findings include that although the DWP has made progress in improving the design of some leaflets, it could go further to make them easier for the public to understand and get hold of, as well as improving checks on the accuracy of leaflets and its supply and printing arrangements so that the most recent versions are widely available.

The Thames Gateway regeneration programme covers the area between Canary Wharf in London and the mouth of the River Thames, one of the most deprived areas in the Greater South East. It aims to create 160,000 new homes and 180,000 new jobs in the area by 2016 and with further development beyond that date. This project is one of 15 mission critical programmes prioritised by the Government and requires broad cross-government working so that new homes are supported by adequate transport, education, health, community, leisure, green space and environmental infrastructure. It is the only large scale regeneration programme managed directly by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Following on from a NAO report (HCP 526, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780102945263) published in May 2007, the Committee's report examines the DCLG's overall management of the programme on four main issues: turning aspirations into plans that are delivered; more integrated and better co-ordinated expenditure; progress on delivering homes and employment opportunities; and achieving high quality and environmentally sustainable development. Conclusions drawn include that the Department's management has been weak and its programme management systems are not commensurate with the programme's size and scale of ambition. Measurable objectives and robust systems to measure progress are lacking, there are concerns over costing and delivery chain issues.and there is a risk that the economic benefits of regeneration will not reach existing residents.

When Railtrack first planned the upgrade of the West Coast Mainline it was to have been completed in two phases in 2002 and 2005, used untried signalling technology and cost £2.6 billion. In the event the signalling was not installed, progress was much slower than anticipated and Railtrack collapsed. Network rail took over the project and put in place a more robust strategy to deliver the upgrade in three stages between 2004 and 2008. The first two stages have already been delivered on schedule. However the total modernisation cost is likely to be around £8.6 billion and the line will still be prone to overcrowding at peak times and is thus likely to need further investment. This report looks at the project on the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Properly managed, the use of temporary nurses can play an important role in helping hospital achieve flexibility. However their high use can have a detrimental impact on patient care and satisfaction. In 2001 the Department of Health anticipated that a growth in the NHS workforce would lead to a decline in the use of temporary staff but in spite of this intention temporary nurses still account for the same percentage of the nursing budget (around 9%). On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Committee has investigated the extent of the use of temporary nurses; whether the process is properly planned and managed; and whether there are safety and quality implications. One of the conclusions is that there has a lack of planning and it is only as a result of the problem with deficits that the NHS has taken a more co-ordinated approach

This report from the Committee of Public Accounts provides information on the time, cost and performance of the 20 largest projects of the Ministry of Defence where the main investment decision (known as Main Gate) has been taken. This report follows on from a two volume NAO report published in November 2006 (HCP 23-I/23-II, 06/07 - ISBNs 9780102943740; 9780102943733), into the major projects of the Ministry of Defence. Evidence was taken by the Committee based on the NAO report, covering three main issues: the impact of the cost saving measures identified by the Departmental reviews in 2005-06; the performance of individual projects; the Department's initiatives to improve acquisition performance. The Department undertook a review of the 20 post-Main Gate projects, which reduced costs by £781 million. With £91 million a HM Revenue & Customs rebate, and £242 million the result of better management of commercial and contractual arrangements. But, £448 million of the costs were reclassified as expenditure in other procurement or support budgets or towards corporate management. The re-allocations have, according to the Committee, achieved cost reductions for individual projects, but do not represent a saving for the Department as a whole. Total forecast costs for the approved projects amounts to £27 billion, some 11% over budget. Forecast in-service dates slipped 33 months in-year, and there is a cumulative delay of 433 months for projects over their lives so far. The Department is now placing increased emphasis on through life management of Defence projects, involving the life-cycle management of the projects, services and activities.

The Government's Efficiency Programme is designed to achieve ongoing efficiency gains across the public sector of £21.5 billion a year by 2007-08 to improve front line services, to reduce Civil Service posts by more than 70,000 and to reallocate a further 13,500 posts to front line services.Departments are responsible for delivering and quantifying the efficiencies achieved while the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) checks the robustness of figures put forward and provides support to help departments deliver their gains. On 26 February the Committee took evidence on the £13.3 billion of annual efficiency gains departments had reported up to 30 September 2006. While some of these reported gains are robust, almost £10 billion of reported efficiency gains remain uncertain. On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General,evidence was taken from OGC and the Treasury on four main issues: the measurement of efficiency gains and headcount reductions; the effects of efficiency projects on service quality; the management of the Programme; and embedding a culture of efficiency into the public sector.

The Countryside Rights of Way Act 2000 introduced a public right to walk across designated mountain, moor, heath, downs and registered common land in England. DEFRA tasked the Countryside Agency with opening-up the new access by the end of 2005, and the target was met with two months to spare. However the implementation of the right to roam cost the Countryside Agency £24.6 million more than anticipated, with knock-on impacts on other programmes. This report looks at the implementation of open access and the effect of the policy under the headings: encouraging the public to use the right to roam across the countryside; protecting the environment of access land and the rights of landowners; improving planning and project management. However the success of legislation is as yet unknown because there is no information on the extent to which the public are making use of their new right. In October 2006 the responsibility for open access passed from the Countryside Agency to Natural England.