This monograph examines the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the primary means of preventing global insurgency. The paper is broken into four sections. The History section gives a basic background of Special Operations Forces, with emphasis on historical examples relevant to this topic. The historical overview shows that insurgency is an old form of warfare and is traditionally difficult to fight. The history of special operations shows a divergence over the past fifty years that has caused a decreasing capability in executing and coordinating FID and UW operations. Following the history, are three recommendations, each with internal supporting exposition.

Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

At the end of World War II, the Army developed the concept of unconventional warfare, or UW, based largely on the experiences of Soldiers who had worked with resistance movements during the war. The concept was formally introduced into doctrine in 1955, specifically to convey a wider responsibility than simply working alongside guerrilla forces. UW is currently defined as: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area. From the beginning, UW has been a mission of Special Forces, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has been the proponent for UW training and doctrine. Our operating environment has been less constant since the 1950s, however. We no longer face the threat of major combat operations, as during World War II. The dominant form of warfare that now confronts the United States and will likely do so for the remainder of the 21st century is irregular warfare. The five components of irregular warfare -- counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, counterinsurgency and UW -- will increasingly involve all elements of the U.S. military and other elements of national power. UW thus presents a challenge to conventional forces and special-operations forces alike. This handbook, although it is not doctrine, is intended to introduce a new generation of Soldiers to the concept, the history and the techniques of UW. It is intended to be the first in a series of papers published to inform readers and provoke thought on a number of topics that are of interest to members of the special-operations community and, in some cases, general-purpose forces as well. This handbook is presented in easy to read 5x8 paperback format. For more like this, look for the distinctive OCP camouflage covers.

This publication, “Counterinsurgency Operations (Joint Publication 3-24),” provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. The twenty-first century is typified by a volatile international environment, persistent conflict, and increasing state fragility. Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to exacerbate or create core grievances within some states, resulting in political strife, instability, or even insurgency. Moreover, some transnational terrorists/extremists with radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat. Insurgency is an internal threat that uses subversion and violence to reach political ends. Conversely, counterinsurgents seek to defeat insurgents and address core grievances to prevent insurgency's expansion or regeneration. Typically the insurgents will solicit or be offered some type of support from state or non-state actors, which can include transnational terrorists who take advantage of the situation for their own benefit. Affected nations may request United States support in countering an insurgency, which is typically the circumstances under which US forces become involved in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all host nation (HN), US, and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required for effective COIN. In traditional warfare the conflict focuses on defeating the opposing military through force-on-force engagements, and influencing the government by taking control of their territory, and influencing the people generally through intimidation, fear, and deception; whereas in irregular warfare (IW), the conflict focuses more on the control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population and not on the control of an adversary's forces or territory. Some military operations, such as foreign internal defense (FID), COIN, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare (UW) are primarily conducted during IW. COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The balance of these operations must be appropriate to accomplish the current phase's objectives. Offensive and defensive operations in COIN that are predominantly aimed at insurgent combatants are counterguerrilla operations. Stability operations are consequently fundamental to COIN—stability operations address the core grievances of insurgency as well as drivers of conflict and are therefore essential to long-term success. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed. The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. But insurgency remains challenging for the United States because two of its dominant characteristics--protractedness and ambiguity-- mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest. Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime's military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic capabilities; and, encouraging and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.

At the end of World War II, the Army developed the concept of unconventional warfare, or UW, based largely on the experiences of Soldiers who had worked with resistance movements during the war. The concept was formally introduced into doctrine in 1955, specifically to convey a wider responsibility than simply working alongside guerrilla forces. UW is currently defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area. From the beginning, UW has been a mission of Special Forces, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has been the proponent for UW training and doctrine. Our operating environment has been less constant since the 1950s, however. We no longer face the threat of major combat operations, as during World War II. The dominant form of warfare that now confronts the United States and will likely do so for the remainder of the 21st century is irregular warfare. The five components of irregular warfare - counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, counterinsurgency and UW - will increasingly involve all elements of the U.S. military and other elements of national power. UW thus presents a challenge to conventional forces and special-operations forces alike. This paper, although it is not doctrine, is intended to introduce a new generation of Soldiers to the concept, the history and the techniques of UW. It is intended to be the first in a series of papers published to inform readers and provoke thought on a number of topics that are of interest to members of the special-operations community and, in some cases, general-purpose forces as well.

Countering global insurgency will be a critically important mission for our nation in the 21st Century. Previous insurgencies were only marginally threatening to American interests because of the regional focus and intrinsically limited scale of those insurgencies. But the technologies that enable the prosperity of a global marketplace and enhance the lives of those who participate in that marketplace also provides our insurgent enemies with the means to directly threaten our nation and way of life. Today's Global War on Terrorism places us in an unfamiliar environment that many have called the first global insurgency. In this global insurgency, as in other insurgencies, our shadowy opponents will not confront us in the open. Rather they will attack our vulnerabilities, the exploitable seams that inherently exist between coalition partners, government agencies, and military commands. In these attacks, 21st Century global insurgents will use terrorism and other asymmetric tactics as their principle method to penetrate those seams, create divisiveness, and ultimately disrupt our functionally oriented defenses.