A number of naval exercises can be conducted in port, using various forms of simulation, rather than at sea. Some groups, such as commercial shipping, already rely more heavily on such training than the U.S. Navy does. Can the U.S. Navy do the same, yet still maintain or improve readiness? The authors look at current uses of simulation and suggest ways to best use underway and simulation training time and strategies for implementation.

Navy surface force training has traditionally involved a combination of shore-based and underway training. Recently, however, a number of factors-budgetary, political, and environmental concerns, as well as concerns about quality of life for naval personnel-have prompted Navy training officials to consider reducing underway training time and increasing reliance on shore-based simulators. Current personnel practices, such as rotating crews rather than ships to forward-deployed locations, also suggest that requiring crews to complete their training on the ships on which they will be deployed may be impractical. Finally, technological advances have improved productivity and realism in modeling, simulation, and distributed learning.

"U.S. Navy surface combatant ship crew training involves a combination of shore-based, onboard pier-side, and underway training. Underway training is expensive, however, and it increases wear and tear on operating equipment. Furthermore, constrained budgets and increasing recapitalization costs have forced the Navy to examine various methods -- such as increased use of simulators -- to reduce the annual operating costs of the fleet. Technological improvements have increased the fidelity and realism of simulators, and simulation is being used more widely for training within the U.S. Navy, in other navies, and in commercial shipping companies. Although the Navy's surface combatant community currently uses simulators in its training regimen, an increased use of simulation could potentially improve training efficiency, sustain training readiness, and reduce underway days. Focusing on the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class of surface combatants, RAND examines the training requirements of surface forces, determines where credit is granted for the use of simulation, estimates what training is done underway, examines simulation technology, and identifies areas where simulation could be substituted for underway training without any decrease in readiness. The authors find that although most exercises are done underway, many could be done in port with or without the use of simulators. Accordingly, the Navy should consider (1) investing in shore-based engineering simulators, (2) directing that exercises that can be done in port be done in port, and (3) accelerating the upgrades that are slowly providing DDG-51-class ships with an embedded engineering training capability." -- publisher's website.

The U.S. Navy trains its surface combatant ship crews through a combination of shore-based, onboard pier-side, and underway training. Much of this training has traditionally involved significant periods of underway time, which allows units to achieve required certifications and readiness levels. Underway training is expensive, however, because fuel and consumables are expended while a ship is underway; wear and tear on operating equipment also drive up maintenance costs. One day's worth of fuel for one surface combatant costs approximately $40,000. Tight budgets and increasing recapitalization costs have forced the Navy to examine various methods to reduce the annual operating costs of the fleet. Technological improvements have increased the fidelity and realism of simulators, and simulation is being used more widely for training within the U.S. Navy. Although the Navy's surface combatant community currently uses simulators in its training regimen, an increased use of simulation could improve training efficiency, sustain training readiness, and potentially reduce underway days. This research identified underway training requirements for surface combatants for unit-level training (ULT), the number of underway days required to accomplish that training, and where credit for meeting training requirements through the use of simulation is currently granted. In addition, it identified which training requirements can only be completed underway, which can be completed in port without simulation, and which can be completed in port via simulation. The authors then surveyed available simulation technologies to determine if they could be substituted for training that is currently being performed underway. The research focused on the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class surface combatants because the DDG-51 class has the greatest number of ships in the surface combatant fleet, providing a large data set for an analysis of training exercises performed.

Can the U.S. Navy save money by increasing its use of simulators without sacrificing readiness? The authors look at the use of simulators in the Air Force, the Marines, and French and British forces to see if the Navy's current mix of simulator and live training should be changed substantially for the first time since the 1970s. After presenting the data for each service branch and type of simulator, the authors conclude that the Navy must first decide how it wants to measure readiness before an increased use of simulators will yield tangible returns in the form of increased proficiency at lower cost.

The Office of Naval Research, known widely as ONR, was formed in 1946 largely to support the pursuit of basic science to help ensure future U.S. naval dominance—and as such, it set the model for the subsequently created National Science Foundation. But everything changed after the Cold War. The U.S. entered a period of greater fiscal constraints and the concept of warfare shifted from conventional land and sea battles and super-power conflicts to an era of asymmetric warfare, where the country might be engaged in many smaller fights in unconventional arenas. Naval Innovation in the 21st Century is a narrative account of ONR’s efforts to respond to this transformation amidst increasing pressure to focus on programs directly relevant to the Navy, but without sacrificing the “seed corn” of fundamental science the organization helped pioneer. Told through the eyes of the admirals leading ONR and the department heads who oversee key programs, the book follows the organization as it responds to the fall of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These events are inspiring an array of innovations, for land and sea. Consider unmanned undersea vehicles that can patrol strategic coastlines for months on end, novel types of landing craft that can travel up to 2,500 nautical miles without refueling, and precision shipborne “rail guns” whose GPS-guided shells can hit targets from hundreds of miles off. Other efforts include advanced electronics designed to swap out scores of antennas on ships for two solid-state apertures, greatly increasing speed and stealth and speed; virtual training methods that spare the environment by avoid the need to fire tons of live shells, and new ways to protect Marines from improvised explosive devices. All these programs, some pursued in conventional manner and some set up as “skunk works” designed to spur out-of-the-box thinking, are part of an ongoing evolution that seeks to connect scientific investment more directly to the warfighter without forsaking the Navy’s longer-term future. Naval Innovation in the 21st Century is a narrative history, and a story of organizational change, centered around the struggles of management and key personnel to adapt to shifting priorities while holding on to their historic core mission of supporting longer-term research. As such, it holds great lessons and insights for how the U.S. government should fund and maintain military R&D in a new era of “small ball” conflicts—and how the country must prepare for the future of warfare."