In this first of a two-volume study, Dr. Futrell presents a chronological survey of the development of Air Force doctrine and thinking from the beginnings of powered flight to the onset of the space age. He outlines the struggle of early aviation enthusiasts to gain acceptance of the airplane as a weapon and win combat-arm status for the Army Air Service (later the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force). He surveys the development of airpower doctrine during the 1930s and World War II and outlines the emergence of the autonomous US Air Force in the postwar period. Futrell brings this first volume to a close with discussions of the changes in Air Force thinking and doctrine necessitated by the emergence of the intercontinental missile, the beginnings of space exploration and weapon systems, and the growing threat of limited conflicts resulting from the Communist challenge of wars of liberation. In volume two, the author traces the new directions that Air Force strategy, policies, and thinking took during the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam War, and the post-Vietnam period. Futrell outlines how the Air Force struggled with President Kennedy's redefinition of national security policy and Robert S. McNamara's managerial style as secretary of defense. He describes how the Air Force argued that airpower should be used during the war in Southeast Asia. He chronicles the evolution of doctrine and organization regarding strategic, tactical, and airlift capabilities and the impact that the aerospace environment and technology had on Air Force thinking and doctrine.

General Kenney Reports is a classic account of a combat commander in action. General George Churchill Kenney arrived in the South- west Pacific theater in August 1942 to find that his command, if not in a shambles, was in dire straits. The theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur, had no confidence in his air element. Kenney quickly changed this situation. He organized and energized the Fifth Air Force, bringing in operational commanders like Whitehead and Wurtsmith who knew how to run combat air forces. He fixed the logistical swamp, making supply and maintenance supportive of air operations, and encouraging mavericks such as Pappy Gunn to make new and innovative weapons and to explore new tactics in airpower application. The result was a disaster for the Japanese. Kenney's airmen used air power-particularly heavily armed B-25 Mitchell bombers used as commerce destroyers-to savage Japanese supply lines, destroying numerous ships and effectively isolating Japanese garrisons. The classic example of Kenney in action was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, which marked the attainment of complete Allied air dominance and supremacy over Japanese naval forces operating around New Guinea. In short, Kenney was a brilliant, innovative airman, who drew on his own extensive flying experiences to inform his decision-making. General Kenney Reports is a book that has withstood the test of time, and which should be on the shelf of every airman.

n this extremely comprehensive overview of airlift and air mobility, Colonel Miller shows how the worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free-world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Airlift is the movement of goods and people to where they are needed, when they are needed there. Since the 1920s there has been an evolving awareness and articulation of how to best organize, train, and equip airlift forces for that mission. The worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Colonel Miller's study traces these many interrelationships to discover what critical airlift decisions were made, why they were made, and what they may mean in the future. Airlift is the backbone of deterrence. A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy. How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process.

Command is the ultimate service. It is a time when we have the singular responsibility to create and lead strong Air Force units. A time when our passion for our Air Force and our vision for its future must be overwhelmingly clear. Early in the "Developing Aerospace Leaders" initiative, we began to focus on the way in which the institution teaches leadership and prepares airmen for command. What we found was a wide range of practices and a wide range of expectations - a complicating factor in today's Expeditionary Aerospace Force. We realize that preparing our officers to command effective, mission-oriented units must be a deliberate process. It must develop our unique airman perspective, creating commanders who are able to communicate the vision, have credibility in the mission area, and can lead our people with inspiration and heart. The foundation of our institution's effectiveness has always been its leaders. Colonel Goldfein's work provides valuable lessons learned and serves as a worthwhile tool to optimize your effectiveness as a squadron commander. This book is a must-read, not only for those selected to command a squadron but for all our young officers, helping them understand what the requirements of squadron command will be. Remember, command is a unique privilege - a demanding and crucial position in our Air Force. "Sharing Success - Owning Failure" takes you a step closer to successfully meeting that challenge.

This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

The author's interest in Air Force doctrine was first aroused when he was a sergeant serving as an aerial gunnery instructor in early 1943. When the operational research people revealed that what we were teaching was faulty, he came to realize that the Air Force system for developing doctrine was flawed. The problem continued to interest him and later, after he was commissioned and serving on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, he wrote his book Ideas and Weapons using the experience of the air arm to expound the need for a more systematic procedure for developing doctrine. Because the doctrinal materials gathered on World War II were still highly classified, he reverted to World War I to put across his thesis without violating security. The author's real concern was to contribute to the soon to be established US Air Force in the search for a more effective means of formulating doctrine. The essays that follow reflect how his ideas developed over the 30-odd years of my Air Force career. Inevitably there are some overlaps and repetitions given the origin of these essays as articles and lectures spread over many years. The main themes are evident. He repeatedly made the case for the importance of doctrine and the need to perfect the technological advances in equipment. He was concerned to see that doctrine was continually perfected in peacetime and not just in wartime when the pressure of enemy performance provides a powerful incentive to do this. Another theme repeatedly stated was the need for officers suitably educated to see the importance of doctrine and realize that doctrine is literally “everybody's business” and not just the concern of a handful of individuals assigned to the formal task of compiling doctrinal manuals. These people are important, but they cannot perform effectively if officers throughout the service fail to write after-action reports summarizing their valuable experiences, not just in air operations but in all aspects of the air arm activities, procurement, personnel administration, logistics, and legislative liaison. One can easily make the case that improving the ability of the Air Force to cope with Congress is just as important as suggesting the best possible doctrine for aerial combat. One can't just assume that every newly promoted flag officer will instinctively understand the best way of testifying on Capitol Hill. Much of the doctrinal problem within the Air Force stems from the professional education of officers. Unless they are rigorously educated to undertake the objective analysis of recorded historical experience, all the most carefully edited doctrinal manuals will avail little. One of the author's insistent themes is the need to make doctrinal manuals not only more readable but more memorable. To this end several of the following essays are addressed to those who are assigned as doctrinal writers.