"This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. In substantive U.S. national security terms, Dr. Manwaring addresses the questions, Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done? He explains the importance of that troubled country to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then Dr. Manwaring makes a case against continued tactical and operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what must be done. In that connection, he recommends an actionable political-military strategy to attain security, stability, democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The proposed strategy would not be costly in monetary or military terms. It would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation, time, and will."--SSI.

"This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. In substantive U.S. national security terms, Dr. Manwaring addresses the questions, Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done? He explains the importance of that troubled country to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then Dr. Manwaring makes a case against continued tactical and operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what must be done. In that connection, he recommends an actionable political-military strategy to attain security, stability, democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The proposed strategy would not be costly in monetary or military terms. It would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation, time, and will."--SSI.

Colombia is the most troubled country in the Western Hemisphere. Drug criminals, guerrillas, and paramilitary groups are feeding a spiral of violence that makes "colombianization" a metaphor for a failing state. The authors address the strategic dimensions of the crisis. It argues that Colombia's future deeply affects regional security and U.S. interests. The country's afflictions are spilling over its borders, threatening Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and the Caribbean. At the same time, Colombia is the origin of most of the cocaine and heroin entering the United States. The fear is that, if the situation continues to worsen, the country may become balkanized, with large areas under the de facto control of guerrilla and paramilitary regimes based, in large part, on narco-economies. U.S. policy is now at a critical juncture. A decision has been made to become more engaged in the war against narcotrafficking. Yet, the question remains: Can counternarcotics be separated from counterinsurgency? The authors believe that it cannot--that everything is related to everything else--and that unless the Colombian and U.S. governments address the problem through the creation of a coherent, holistic strategy, the situation will become much worse. In the latter half of their report, they discuss both the military and nonmilitary components of such a strategy. Among other things, they contend that restrictions on U.S. police training and counterinsurgency assistance should be removed or revised in order to enable the Colombian security forces to halt the momentum of the insurgents and paramilitaries and give them incentives to negotiate seriously. They also argue that a respect for human rights is of strategic importance.

Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.