Enhancement of the nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting of (MPC & A) at the Elektrostal Machine-Building Plant (ELEMASH) has proceeded in two phases. Initially, Elektrostal served as the model facility at which to test US/Russian collaboration and to demonstrate MPC & A technologies available for safeguards enhancements at Russian facilities. This phase addressed material control and accounting (MC & A) in the low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel-fabrication processes and the physical protection (PP) of part of the (higher-enrichment) breeder-fuel process. The second phase, identified later in the broader US/Russian agreement for expanded MPC & A cooperation. includes implementation of appropriate MC & A and PP systems in the breeder-fuel fabrication processes. Within the past year, an automated physical protection system has been installed and demonstrated in building 274, and an automated MC & A system has been designed and is being installed and will be tested in the LEU process. Attention has now turned to assuring longterm sustainability for the first phase and beginning MPC & A upgrades for the second phase. Sustainability measures establish the infrastructure for operation, maintenance, and repair of the installed systems-with US support for the lifetime of the US/Russian Agreement, but evolving toward full Russian operation of the system over the long term. For phase 2, which will address higher enrichments, projects have been identified to characterize the facilities, design MPC & A systems, procure appropriate equipment, and install and test final systems. One goal in phase 2 will be to build on initial work to create shared, plant-wide MPC & A assets for operation, maintenance, and evaluation of all safeguards systems.

In September 1993, an implementing agreement was signed that authorized collaborative projects to enhance Russian national materials control and accounting, physical protection, and regulatory activities, with US assistance funded by the Nunn-Lugar Act. At the first US-Russian technical working group meeting in Moscow in February 1994, it was decided to identify a model facility where materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) and regulatory projects could be carried out using proven technologies and approaches. The low-enriched uranium (LEU or RBMK and VVER) fuel-fabrication process at Elektrostal was selected, and collaborative work began in June 1994. Based on many factors, including initial successes at Elektrostal, the Russians expanded the cooperation by proposing five additional sites for MPC and A development: the Elektrostal medium-enriched uranium (MEU or BN) fuel-fabrication process and additional facilities at Podolsk, Dmitrovgrad, Obninsk, and Mayak. Since that time, multilaboratory teams have been formed to develop and implement MPC and A upgrades at the additional sites, and much new work is underway. This paper summarizes the current status of MPC and A enhancement projects in the LEU fuel-fabrication process and discusses the status of work that addresses similar enhancements in the MEU (BN) fuel processes at Elektrostal, under the recently expanded US-Russian MPC and A cooperation.

The US-Russian Government-to-Government Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC & A) evolved from the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. In 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) assumed responsibility as the executive agent for implementation of the Government-to-Government MPC & A Program, followed by the programmatic responsibility for funding. The Russian Program initially emphasized limited exchanges, demonstrations, and upgrades at low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication facility at Elektrostal in 1994. The program has expanded to include upgrades at nuclear facilities across Russia, development of the Russian Methodological Training Center (RMTC) in Obninsk; and cooperation with Gosatomnadzor, the Russian Federal Nuclear Radiation and Safety Authority. This paper describes the overall program including program objectives, approach, and US-Russian participation, with an emphasis on DOE-GAN cooperation.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has since authorized more than $1.5 billion for a wide array of weapons destruction, demilitarization, nuclear security, and nonproliferation activities in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) poses the single greatest threat to the national security of the United States. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has noted, The greatest threat to our society at the moment are the weapons of mass destruction. Those are the weapons that know no boundaries. Yet efforts to stem the spread of these weapons suffered serious setbacks during the past year. Every week brought news of Iranian and North Korean missile tests; of the possible terrorist use of deadly biological and chemical agents; and, most dramatically, of nuclear tests in the deserts and mountains of South Asia. There has never been a better time for a new, comprehensive review of the troubled state of the international non-proliferation regime along with credible solutions for today's most pressing proliferation problems. Repairing the Regime, is just such a book. In early 1999, 450 experts from 17 nations attended the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington DC, the most important annual gathering in the non-proliferation field. This collection reflects their passionate debates on the key issues, trends, and dilemmas facing all of us today. It provides strong arguments for both marshaling international resources to repair and sustain the global non-proliferation regime and for dealing concretely with the particular security concerns of the nations and regions most affected by contemporary threats. Repairing the Regime looks at a multitude of strategies for strengthening controls on WMD and increasing security around the world.

The successor states of the former Soviet Union have enormous stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material and other militarily significant commodities and technologies. Preventing the flow of such items to countries of proliferation concern and to terrorist groups is a major objective of U.S. national security policy. This book reviews the effectiveness of two U.S. programs directed to this objective. These programs have supported the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan in upgrading the physical protection, control, and accountability of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and strengthening systems to control the export of many types of militarily sensitive items.