President Clinton and other U.S. officials have warned that "rogue states" pose a major threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era. But what exactly is a rogue state? Does the concept foster a sound approach to foreign policy, or is it, in the end, no more than a counterproductive political epithet? Robert Litwak traces the origins and development of rogue state policy and then assesses its efficacy through detailed case studies of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He shows that the policy is politically selective, inhibits the ability of U.S. policymakers to adapt to changed conditions, and has been rejected by the United States' major allies. Litwak concludes that by lumping and demonizing a disparate group of countries, the rogue state approach obscures understanding and distorts policymaking. In place of a generic and constricting strategy, he argues for the development of "differentiated" strategies of containment, tailored to the particular circumstances within individual states.

"This is a first-rate study that brings scholarly analysis to bear on a very important problem in U.S. foreign policy. Litwak's incisive critique of the use of the 'rogue' label for political 'mobilization' purposes is right on the mark." -- Alexander George, Stanford University "Litwak's examination of U.S. policy toward 'rogue states' raises the right questions regarding a truly complex and yet very timely subject. It skillfully avoids some of the simplifications that have dominated the public discourse on this vital subject." -- Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser President Clinton and other U.S. officials have warned that "rogue states" pose a major threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era. But what exactly is a rogue state? Does the concept foster a sound approach to foreign policy, or is it, in the end, no more than a counterproductive political epithet? Robert Litwak traces the origins and development of rogue state policy and then assesses its efficacy through detailed case studies of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He shows that the policy is politically selective, inhibits the ability of U.S. policymakers to adapt to changed conditions, and has been rejected by the United States' major allies. Litwak concludes that by lumping and demonizing a disparate group of countries, the rogue state approach obscures understanding and distorts policymaking. In place of a generic and constricting strategy, he argues for the development of "differentiated" strategies of containment, tailored to the particular circumstances within individual states.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush described an "axis of evil" consisting of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, as well as other nations that are hostile to the United States, may possess weapons of mass destruction, and either harbor or support terrorists. The authors in this volume discuss the diplomatic, economic, and military policies the United States should pursue in dealing with such nations.

Rogue State and its author came to sudden international attention when Osama Bin Laden quoted the book publicly in January 2006, propelling the book to the top of the bestseller charts in a matter of hours. This book is a revised and updated version of the edition Bin Laden referred to in his address.

Rogue States: The Rule of Force in the World Affairs.

"Identifies and characterizes the most repressive states and singles out which are aggressive. Defines the actions constituting repression and proposes a method of measuring human rights violations, presenting an index of nation-state repressiveness. Offers a way to decide which repressive and rogue states are most deserving of strong policy attention"--Provided by publisher.

In this incisive examination of our national security policy, Michael Klare suggests that the Pentagon in effect established a new class of enemies when the Cold War came to an -unpredictable and hostile states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Klare argues that the containment of these rising Third World powers-Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, especially-became the centerpiece of American military policy and the justification for near-Cold War levels of military sping.