At the beginning of World War II, in the midst of building the United States Navy into a "two-ocean fleet," the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor put the effectiveness of American sea power in doubt. Three and a half years later, the U.S. Navy was undoubtedly the strongest in the world. In that time, the Japanese fleet had been shattered, the U-Boat threat was a thing of the past, and the Navy had supported the greatest amphibious campaigns in history. "U.S. Navy at War: Official Reports by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N.," consisting of three reports submitted by Admiral King to the Secretary of the Navy in the course of the war, is an official account of the U.S. Navy's operations in World War II. It provides an authoritative contemporary account of the beginning of the fleet buildup prior to the outbreak of war; the campaigns in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean; naval research and development; submarine warfare; and many other aspects of the naval war. In addition, the book provides useful listings of all U.S. ships added to the fleet between December 7, 1941 and October 1, 1945, a list of U.S. ships lost in combat, and another that outlines the status of major combatant ships of the Japanese Navy at the end of the war - a sobering testimony to the overwhelming naval superiority achieved by the United States. Long out of print, "U.S. Navy at War" remains a unique source for anyone interested in the Second World War at sea. Originally published in 1946. 310 pages, ill.

Agents of Innovation examines the influence of the General Board of the Navy as agents of innovation during the period between World Wars I and II. The General Board, a formal body established by the Secretary of the Navy to advise him on both strategic matters with respect to the fleet, served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and the naval limitations imposed on the Navy by treaty during the period. Particularly important was the General Board’s role in implementing the Washington Naval Treaty that limited naval armaments after 1922. The General Board orchestrated the efforts by the principal Naval Bureaus, the Naval War College, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in ensuring that the designs adopted for the warships built and modified during the period of the Washington and London Naval Treaties both met treaty requirements while attempting to meet strategic needs. The leadership of the Navy at large, and the General Board in particular, felt themselves especially constrained by Article XIX (the fortification clause) of the Washington Naval Treaty that implemented a status quo on naval fortifications in the Western Pacific. The treaty system led the Navy to design a measurably different fleet than it might otherwise have in the absence of naval limitations. Despite these limitations, the fleet that fought the Japanese to a standstill in 1942 was predominately composed of ships and concepts developed and fostered by the General Board prior to the outbreak of war.