The impact of monetary policy in large advanced countries on emerging market economies—dubbed spillovers—is hotly debated in global and national policy circles. When the U.S. resorted to unconventional monetary policy, spillovers on asset prices and capital flows were significant, though remained smaller in countries with better fundamentals. This was not because monetary policy shocks changed (in size, sign or impact on stance). In fact, the traditional signaling channel of monetary policy continued to play the leading role in transmitting shocks, relative to other channels, affecting longer-term bond yields. Instead, we find that larger spillovers stem more from structural factors, such as the use of new instruments (asset purchases). We obtain these results by developing a new methodology to extract, separate, and interpret U.S. monetary policy shocks.

Most trade is invoiced in very few currencies. Despite this, the Mundell-Fleming benchmark and its variants focus on pricing in the producer’s currency or in local currency. We model instead a ‘dominant currency paradigm’ for small open economies characterized by three features: pricing in a dominant currency; pricing complementarities, and imported input use in production. Under this paradigm: (a) the terms-of-trade is stable; (b) dominant currency exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices is high regardless of destination or origin of goods; (c) exchange rate pass-through of non-dominant currencies is small; (d) expenditure switching occurs mostly via imports, driven by the dollar exchange rate while exports respond weakly, if at all; (e) strengthening of the dominant currency relative to non-dominant ones can negatively impact global trade; (f) optimal monetary policy targets deviations from the law of one price arising from dominant currency fluctuations, in addition to the inflation and output gap. Using data from Colombia we document strong support for the dominant currency paradigm.

There is growing recognition that prolonged monetary policy easing of major economies can have extraterritorial spillovers, driving up financial system leverage in other countries. When faced with such a rise of threats to financial stability, what can countries do? Specifically, is there a role for macroprudential tools, capital controls or foreign exchange intervention in safeguarding financial stability from risks arising externally? We examine the efficacy of these policy interventions by exploring whether preemptive or reactive policy interventions can mitigate such risks. Using a sample of 950 bank and nonbank financial firms across 28 non-U.S. economies over the past two decades, we show that if policymakers are able to implement policies prior to an additional consecutive decline in U.S. interest rates, financial institutions do not increase their leverage by as much as they otherwise would. By contrast, it is more difficult to counter the spillovers with reactive policy interventions. In practice, however, policymakers need to remain cautious about the timing of preventative tightening, especially when their economies face large negative shocks such as a pandemic.

We study the impact of the US quantitative easing (QE) on both the emerging and advanced economies, estimating a global vector error-correction model (GVECM) and conducting counterfactual analyses. We focus on the effects of reductions in the US term and corporate spreads. First, US QE measures reducing the US corporate spread appear to be more important than lowering the US term spread. Second, US QE measures might have prevented episodes of prolonged recession and deflation in the advanced economies. Third, the estimated effects on the emerging economies have been diverse but often larger than those recorded in the US and other advanced economies. The heterogeneous effects from US QE measures indicate unevenly distributed benefits and costs.

Alan S. Blinder offers the dual perspective of a leading academic macroeconomist who served a stint as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board—one who practiced what he had long preached and then returned to academia to write about it. He tells central bankers how they might better incorporate academic knowledge and thinking into the conduct of monetary policy, and he tells scholars how they might reorient their research to be more attuned to reality and thus more useful to central bankers. Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins Lectures, this readable book deals succinctly, in a nontechnical manner, with a wide variety of issues in monetary policy. The book also includes the author's suggested solution to an age-old problem in monetary theory: what it means for monetary policy to be "neutral."

We examine three main channels through which U.S. monetary policy shocks affect firm investment in foreign countries: (1) the balance sheet channel; (2) the financial channel of the exchange rate; and (3) the trade channel. For this purpose, we use quarterly firm-level data for 63 advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) over 1996-2016. Our results suggest an important and independent role for all three key channels. U.S. monetary policy shocks have larger effects on investment for firms that are more leveraged (balance sheet channel), for firms that have a higher share of debt in foreign currency (financial channel of the exchange rate), and for firms that operate in sectors with higher export dependence (trade channel). Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the balance sheet channel is the most important channel of transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks on aggregate firm investment.