This book examines how the US Army rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War and how this has effected US intervention policy after the Cold War.

During the post--World War II era, American foreign policy prominently featured direct U.S. military intervention in the Third World. Yet the cold war placed restraints on where and how Washington could intervene until the collapse of the former Soviet Union removed many of the barriers to -- and ideological justifications for -- American intervention. Since the end of the cold war, the United States has completed several military interventions that may be guided by motives very different from those invoked before the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Likewise, such operations, now free from the threat of counterintervention by any other superpower, seem governed by a new set of rules. In this readily accessible study, political scientist Glenn J. Antizzo identifies fifteen factors critical to the success of contemporary U.S. military intervention and evaluates the likely efficacy of direct U.S. military involvement today -- when it will work, when it will not, and how to undertake such action in a manner that will bring rapid victory at an acceptable political cost. He lays out the preconditions that portend success, among them a clear and attainable goal; a mission that is neither for "peacekeeping" nor for "humanitarian aid within a war zone"; a strong probability the American public will support or at least be indifferent to the effort; a willingness to utilize ground forces if necessary; an operation limited in geographic scope; and a theater commander permitted discretion in the course of the operation. Antizzo then tests his abstract criteria by using real-world case studies of the most recent fully completed U.S. military interventions -- in Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992--94, and Kosovo in 1999 -- with Panama, Iraq, and Kosovo representing generally successful interventions and Somalia an unsuccessful one. Finally, he considers how the development of a "Somalia Syndrome" affected U.S. foreign policy and how the politics and practice of military intervention have continued to evolve since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, giving specific attention to the current war in Afghanistan and the larger War on Terror. U.S. Military Intervention in the Post--Cold War Era exemplifies political science at its best: the positing of a hypothetical model followed by a close examination of relevant cases in an effort to provide meaningful insights for future American international policy.

A study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s.

Publisher Fact Sheet Draws upon case studies - including Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, & Lebanon - & suggests political & military guidelines for potential U.S. military interventions ranging from peacekeeping & humanitarian operations to preventative strikes & all-out warfare.

explains how the US military transformation failed in the post-Cold war era Harvey Sapolsky is a leading defence scholar in the US will be of interest to students of strategic studies, defence studies, military studies, US politics and security studies in general

Since World War II, military intervention in developing world internal conflicts (DWIC) has become the primary form of U.S. military activity, and these interventions have proven unsuccessful in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This book argues such failure was entirely predictable, even inevitable, due both to the nature and dynamics of foreign military intrusion in the affairs of other countries and especially the DWICs that provide the major contemporary form of potential U.S. military in the foreseeable future. Basing its analysis in both human nature (the adverse reaction to prolonged outsider intrusion) and historical analogy, the book argues strongly why military intervention should be avoided as a national security option and the implications of such a policy decision for national security strategy and policy.